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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
I 
Autobiographical writing occupies a unique position among narrative 
modes.  As a genre, it not only tells a story, but offers a platform for studying the 
shifting status of the self, language, truth, and authority.   Normatively, 
autobiography intends to present a clear and accurate picture of the self in 
language.  Patricia Meyer Spacks argues, for example, that “autobiographies 
affirm identity” and that “the autobiographer, attesting his existence by the fact of 
his writing, lives through his explanations, tacit or explicit, of how he came to be 
the person he is” (Spacks 1).  To this end, autobiography seems to coincide with 
the goal of self-mastery.  Based on this definition, three assumptions underlie 
autobiographical writing:  first, that the self (or the “truth” of the self) exists; 
second, that it is accessible and knowable by the author; and third, that it can be 
adequately represented in language.  Operating under these three assumptions, the 
autobiographical author views himself in a position of control over his own 
identity, so that self-mastery appears like a realistic goal.  This aim of this study is 
to examine the ways in which the above assumptions about self-existence, self-
knowledge, and self-representation become destabilized, along with any positivist 
claims to self-mastery and knowability, during the act of autobiographical writing.  
In her essay, “Authorizing the Autobiographical” Shari Benstock writes that 
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“autobiography reveals the impossibility of its own dream:  what begins on the 
presumption of self-knowledge ends in the creation of a fiction that covers over 
the premises of its construction” (Benstock 146).  I will examine two historical 
moments in which autobiography and its implications about selfhood, 
signification, and authorship were most prevalent, namely:  the late 
seventeenth/early eighteenth centuries and the post-structuralist era of the late 
twentieth-century.  This study will look primarily at Daniel Defoe’s Robinson 
Crusoe (1719) and Roxana (1724) written in the eighteenth century, alongside 
J.M. Coetzee’s Foe (1986), a reimagining of Robinson Crusoe and Roxana that 
was written in the late twentieth century at the height of post-structuralism.   
Many Defoe scholars attend to his protagonists’ desire for self-mastery, a 
central theme in Defoe’s works which Coetzee continues in Foe.  In The Rise of 
the Novel, Ian Watt describes Robinson Crusoe as the prototype of the self-made, 
capitalist man, motivated to dominate and control his surroundings in order to 
achieve mastery over his own condition.  James H. Maddox identifies a similar 
pattern in Defoe’s protagonists, arguing that “Mastery of the Other in Defoe is an 
external emblem of self-mastery” (Maddox 669).  Maddox uses the example of 
Moll Flander’s conscious exploitation of men and Crusoe’s massacring of the 
cannibals on the island—both acts of domination.  Both Watt and Maddox posit 
that Defoe’s protagonists’ goal of self-mastery depends on their somewhat 
capitalistic and imperialistic abilities to exert control over their external 
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surroundings.  In this study, I propose instead that, for both Defoe’s and Coetzee’s 
protagonists, the success or failure of self-mastery hinges on the autobiographical 
process, which is concerned with controlling the interior self.   
Currently, there are very few intertextual investigations of Robinson 
Crusoe, Roxana, and Foe, which features the narrator Susan Barton.  Defoe’s 
Roxana is often overlooked in the recent scholarship on Foe, as most critics have 
centered their attention on its parallels with Robinson Crusoe.  The aim of this 
study is to perform an integrative reading of the three texts to demonstrate how, 
together, they accomplish a specific narrative purpose to destabilize the three 
above assumptions that underpin autobiographical writing.  Together, the three 
texts undermine the authority of the author and his/her claims to control over 
identity.  I define “authorship” in this study as not only the act of writing, but the 
business of creating fictions, which can be rendered through written language, 
speech-acts, and behavioral performances.  Roxana, for example, engages in few 
acts of writing besides the autobiography itself, but her propensity to create and 
perform new, ulterior identities is an example of her skill with artistry and 
authorship.  Both Defoe and Coetzee draw attention to the special role that 
language plays in the process of representing, constructing, and discovering 




 In my discussion of the three texts, the “self” cannot be defined in any 
singular way.  It is necessary, then, to identify the multiple “selves” that must be 
accounted for when examining the autobiographical process.  The first is the 
physical self or body, a structure that takes on increasing importance for 
characters like Roxana, whose body operates as a tool for her performances, 
depending on which guise she chooses to wear.  The second is the metaphysical 
self, or the idea of an “interior reality” that exists behind or beyond the physical 
body.  All three narrators, at least at one point in their developmental trajectories, 
believe in the existence of a stable, unitary, and “true” interior reality to their 
identities.  The third is the authorial self or writing subject.  The authorial self 
writes the autobiography and assumes a position of authority and control over the 
fourth self, which is, the objective self or the textual self narrating the 
autobiographical text.  Normatively, autobiographical authors attempt to create an 
image of the objective self that is perfectly symmetrical with the physical, 
metaphysical, and authorial self.  For Crusoe, Roxana, and Susan, language 
(however ostensibly) operates as the connective tissue or fabric that holds these 
fragmented selves together, but Defoe and Coetzee reveal how the linguistic 
connections between these selves are tenuous at best.  
 As authors of their own autobiographies, Crusoe, Roxana, and Susan each 
work toward a similar goal of self-knowledge and self-mastery.  Defoe and 
Coetzee demonstrate through their respective narrators how the authority of the 
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author and the possibility of self-mastery deconstruct during the act of writing.  In 
doing so, they link the question of identity to that of authorship, asking:  to what 
extent is the self its own author?  Both authors’ novels, I will attempt to show, are 
not only works of fiction, but noteworthy contributions to the philosophical 
discourses of the eighteenth and twentieth century respectively—two time periods 
in which normative notions of authority, identity, and language were becoming 
increasingly destabilized.  Coetzee’s post-structural re-imagining of Defoe’s 
earlier novels extends Defoe’s original themes of language and identity.  
Furthermore, it allows the dialogic parallels between eighteenth- and twentieth- 
century philosophy to come into focus.  Therefore, the benefit of examining 
Robinson Crusoe, Roxana, and Foe intertextually is to demonstrate how Defoe 
and Coetzee, and eighteenth- and twentieth- century philosophical discourses, 
share a narrative purpose.   
 For the purposes of this study, it will be helpful to think of Crusoe, 
Roxana, and Susan Barton as the same character, or a “mono-character,” with a 
single developmental trajectory and narrative purpose.  I define this term, “mono-
character
1
,” as a single character who is featured in various texts, usually by the 
                                                          
1
 While the term, “mono-character” is of my own devising, it is heavily indebted to James H. 
Maddox’s critical approach to Defoe’s narrators in his essay “On Defoe’s Roxana.”  Maddox 
proposes that Roxana’s failure to attain self-mastery works to subvert the myth of self-mastery in 
Defoe’s earlier novels, including Robinson Crusoe, Moll Flanders, and Colonel Jack:  
“Roxana…subverts this plot [of self-mastery], especially as it addresses the guilt and anxiety that 
the earlier protagonists are so skilled at leaving behind them” (Maddox 682).  Particularly, 
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same author, but appears in a different form in each text; in most cases, the mono-
character will be revealed through a chronological reading of the author’s texts, 
because each “new” character serves as a revision of the last, while still 
maintaining some key traits of the original.   Each individual character therefore 
represents a different moment in the mono-character’s intellectual development.  I 
will attempt to demonstrate in this study that Robinson Crusoe represents the 
earliest phase in the mono-character’s development; that Roxana represents the 
next phase operating as a revision of Crusoe; and finally, that Coetzee’s Susan 
Barton revises both Crusoe and Roxana, thereby extending the intellectual 
trajectory of the mono-character.  For Defoe and Coetzee, the ultimate goal of 
each character is not to achieve self-mastery per se, but rather, to reach a level of 
understanding that recognizes the impossibility of self-mastery.  Of the three 
characters, Susan comes closest to believing that there is no underlying truth to 
the self, that identity is nothing more than a myth of language, and therefore, that 
selfhood is beyond the reach of authorial control.   All three of these works 
problematize notions of selfhood, signification, and authorship through the use of 
autobiography, and work to disrupt any positivist assumptions about self-
existence, self-knowledge, and self-representation.  But it may be useful, for the 
moment, to briefly examine these three assumptions separately before turning to 
Defoe and Coetzee’s primary texts.     
                                                                                                                                                              
Maddox views Roxana’s character as a revision of Moll’s, while in this study, I argue that Roxana 





 (1) On Self-Existence: Shari Benstock writes that there is a “coincidence 
of ‘ontology’ and ‘autobiography’” (Benstock 145).  For the author, the 
autobiographical mode appears to authorize the self or one’s “being” through the 
act of writing.  In other words, the assumption is that the self must exist if it is 
being written about.  The ontological question regarding self-existence was one of 
increasing importance in the late Renaissance and came to a head in the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth century.  In The Autobiographical Subject, 
Felicity Nussbaum pinpoints the eighteenth century as “a time when identity and 
character are in particular crisis” (Nussbaum xiv).  Descartes reconciled any 
uncertainty about the ontological status of the self during the late Renaissance.  
His Discourse on Method (1637) presented his seminal, “I think, therefore I am” 
approach to the question of self-existence, a claim he attempted to prove through 
logical, a posteriori reasoning. Charles Taylor identifies Descartes’ notions on 
selfhood as a “new subjectivism” which “gives rise to the notion of a subject in its 
modern sense…whereby we place ‘within’ the subject what was previously seen 
as existing” (Taylor 188).  In other words, Descartes’ theories linked subjectivism 
to interiority.  Taylor writes that, for Plato, “Ideas are ontic, the basis of reality; 
for [Descartes], they are the contents of the mind” (188).  Renaissance 
conceptions of self-existence were thus more or less aligned with the idea of 
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stable, interior reality that existed within the physical self.   But by the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth century, the question of self-identity re-emerged 
with full force.  The turbulent political climate of Restoration Britain had a 
destabilizing effect on normative power structures and pre-conceived notions of 
authority.  The political authority of the British monarchy, for example, had 
experienced a number of shifts in power between the Interregnum and 
Restoration, which consequently fuelled interrogations into the basis of authority 
structures more generally, thereby making room for questions about the authority 
and autonomy of the individual self.  J.G.A. Pocock, in his Virtue, Commerce, 
and History, discusses this issue at length:  “seventeenth-century men were still 
pre-modern creatures for whom authority and magistracy were part of a natural 
and cosmic order, and…the starting point of much of their most radical thinking 
was the unimaginable fact that, between 1642 and 1649, authority in England had 
simply collapsed” (Pocock 55).   Such inquiries into authority laid the 
groundwork for a new wave of epistemological paradigms that threaded political, 
religious, and spiritual concerns together.  Pocock continues that many political 
theorists view the seventeenth century as a drastic moment in British history in 
which “authority had disintegrated, and God had withheld his words as to where it 
was lodged, [so] the individual must rediscover in the depths of his own being the 
means of reconstituting and obeying it” (55).  Michael McKeon describes the 
seventeenth century as having undergone an “epistemological transformation,” 
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(McKeon 27) in which philosophers began to question where authority lies, what 
constitutes truth, and how to define such nebulous concepts. The works of 
Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and David Hume played key roles in this 
epistemological transformation of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  Since 
“top-down” authority was for the first time in a long time being called into 
question, what resulted was, as Pocock has suggested, a turn toward 
individualism, subjectivity, and interiority that became increasingly 
epistemological.   Locke and Hume, for example, began to pose questions in their 
respective works that take up from where Descartes left off, such as:  if the self 
exists, what is its substance?  What constitutes the self?   
John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690) confirmed, 
but extended Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am” stance, arguing that human 
identity must be connected to the self’s consciousness:  “Consciousness always 
accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes every one to be what he calls 
self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things; in this alone 
consists personal identity…Consciousness makes personal Identity” (Locke 67-
68).  Extrapolating from Descartes’ original theory, Locke posits that being 
depends on the existence of consciousness.  Consciousness, however, is not itself 
a substance, so it would be inaccurate to say that the self is “made up” of its own 
consciousness, according to Locke.  Instead, the self simply “depends on 
Consciousness, not on Substance…it is the consciousness that goes along with 
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substance…This may show us wherein personal identity consists:  not in the 
identity of substance, but…in the identity of consciousness” (Locke 74).  It would 
be most accurate to say, then, that a personal sense of identity grows out of one’s 
consciousness, according to Locke.  Later in the eighteenth century, the Scottish 
Enlightenment philosopher David Hume takes Locke’s position a few steps 
further, and argues that selfhood depends not on consciousness alone, but on the 
perceptions of the conscious mind.  Presenting the seminal “bundle theory,” 
Hume suggested that the self is “nothing but a bundle or collection of different 
perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivably rapidity, and are in a 
perpetual flux and movement” (Hume 178).  While Locke believed in the 
existence of a self, Hume disrupted such a notion in his Treatise of Human Nature 
(1739), arguing instead that no underlying substance to the self exists, and if it 
does, it is not by any means knowable or accessible to us.  
 In the “long” eighteenth century, philosophers such as Locke and Hume 
anticipated post-structural theories of the self that emerged in the late twentieth 
century.  By suggesting that notions of truth and selfhood may not be readily 
accessible, their work to some extent preempted post-structuralist theory, in which  
“critical discourses…aim to disrupt [notions of] mastery, truth-seeking, and 
systematic closure” (Selden 2).  The French, psychoanalytic philosopher Jacques 
Lacan views the self, for example, as purely a linguistic construct, formed in the 
imagination, and rendered symbolically (Lacan, Language of the Self, 11).  The 
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self, according to Lacan, is nothing more than a product of linguistic imaging that 
is constructed out of a fundamental desire for being.  Identity is therefore the story 
of the self, rather than any substantive entity undergirding an interior reality
2
.  
Michele Foucault, whose theories on the self are built out of Greco-Roman 
philosophy alongside eighteenth-century theorists, argues that the self is a product 
of various “technologies” which impose a set of power structures on the self, such 
as government or religion, which then “determine the conduct of individuals and 
submit them to certain ends of domination” (Foucault 225).  Identity, for 
Foucault, is thus formed and governed by discourse, or structures of power and 
knowledge that are external to the self.  Both Lacan and Foucault seem to 
extrapolate from Hume’s original theory that the metaphysical self-identity does 
not “exist” in the normative sense of the word.  All three agree that the self has no 
definable or identifiable substance, but rather, consists of intrinsically immaterial 
constructs, such as perceptions, language, or power structures.     
(2) On Self-Knowledge:  Benstock argues that the assumption of self-
knowledge is one of the most basic underpinnings of autobiographical writing.  In 
other words, one must know oneself in order to present an accurate self-portrait.  
However, another assumption about self-knowledge is that an author can gain 
knowledge about the self during the act of writing, so that the autobiographical act 
leads to self-discovery, and in the long-run, self-mastery:  “This coming-to-
                                                          
2
 Lacan’s theories of the self are especially relevant to Coetzee’s Foe, which addresses the issue 
of identity as a discursive construction through the character Susan Barton.     
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knowledge of the self constitutes both the desire that initiates the autobiographical 
act and the goal toward which autobiography directs itself.  By means of writing, 
such desire presumably can be fulfilled” (Benstock 146).  Selfhood, and the 
process of self-knowledge through autobiography, therefore took the form of an 
epistemological inquiry.  Locke never attempts to answer the question of what, 
precisely, comprises self-substance.  While he does confirm the existence of a 
self-identity, Locke did not believe that self-knowledge was as straightforward a 
business. If self-identity grows out of consciousness, self-knowledge would 
require an inherent capacity for self-reflexivity.  This task would be simple 
enough if the self were a stable, monolithic entity.  In Imagining the Self, Spacks 
argues that the substantiality of the self was becoming suspect in the eighteenth 
century, as “the eighteenth-century debate on identity became increasingly 
desperate in tone” (Spacks 3).  While Locke confirms self existence as a truth in 
itself, he is careful to note that the self’s ontological dependence on consciousness 
presents some difficulties regarding its knowability: “the difficulty is this, that this 
consciousness being interrupted always by forgetfulness, there being no moment 
in our lives wherein we have the whole train of all our past actions before our 
eyes in one view…in all these cases, our consciousness being interrupted, and we 
losing the sight of our past selves, doubts are raised whether we are the same 
thinking thing, i.e. the same substance or no” (Locke 68).  By referencing 
multiple “selves,” and demonstrating how the self can be fragmented through 
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memory and over time, Locke destabilizes the notion of the self as a stable, 
unitary construct, making its knowability an infinitely difficult business.  He 
draws a distinction between the present, recollecting self and the past, recollected 
self which undoubtedly inhere in the same physical body, but occupy two 
different spaces.   
Hume posits later that the self is in a constant state of flux and that “the 
mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their 
appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures 
and situations” (Hume 178).  If there is no underlying substance unifying these 
multiple selves, the project of self-knowledge becomes nearly impossible. In fact, 
according to Hume, who is today known as one of the first truly skeptic 
philosophers in Britain, the task is actually impossible:  “…had we any idea of the 
substance of our minds, we must also have an impression of it; which is very 
difficult, if not impossible, to be conceived” (164).  Hume’s skepticism reached 
new heights by the post-structuralist era of the late twentieth century, in which the 
possibility of acquiring knowledge about reality was considered highly 
problematic.  During the post-structural era, epistemological inquiries of the self 
were heavily grounded in language.  This “linguistic turn” (Nussbaum 12) in 
epistemology permanently altered the method by which knowledge is acquired, 
not only about the self, but about history, politics, science, and religion as well.  
All access to knowledge of reality must necessarily be “mediated by language and 
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ideology” (Nussbaum 12), which is increasingly problematic given the inherent 
instability of language and meaning.  Locke’s identification of words as “arbitrary 
signs” (Locke 405) of ideas laid the foundation for Saussure’s semiotics 
propounded in his twentieth-century work, Writings in General Linguistics. 
Locke’s distinction between “ideas” and “things” identifies the nuances of what 
Saussure calls “signified” meaning, demonstrating that the signified meaning of a 
word consists of an idea which only refers to a thing.  Jacques Derrida, French 
philosopher and language theorist, later developed a theory positing that the gap 
between “signifier” and “signified” exposes the fact that meaning itself is deferred 
within this gap, and more significantly, that meaning cannot be located in any 
fixed location between the signifier or signified.  Because language was becoming 
known as a highly slippery medium in the twentieth century, its authority as an 
epistemological tool was no longer viable.  The possibility of self-knowledge 
depended on the existence of a stable language system, or more specifically, a 
system of representation that suffered no fissures or discontinuities.        
 (3) Self-Representation:  Locke and Thomas Hobbes were among some 
of the original English philosophers to investigate the purpose and adequacy of 
linguistic representation, and as I already mentioned, paved the way for many 
post-structuralist thinkers.  In Book III of the Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding, Locke writes that “Words, as they are used by Men, can properly 
and immediately signify nothing but Ideas, that are in the Mind of the Speaker… 
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signification…is limited to his Ideas and they can be Signs of nothing else” 
(Locke 405-408).  Locke’s distinction between “ideas” and “things,” “corrected 
the habit of many seventeenth-century grammarians and philosophers of using the 
terms…almost interchangeably” (Hudson 336).  According to Hudson, language 
was understood as originally “instituted by God” and that it “signified objects in 
the world by natural resemblance” (336).  Locke therefore disrupted the prevalent 
belief that “word” and “thing” bore an intrinsic connection.  The possibility of a 
completely lucid form of communication was now, in the eighteenth century, 
being called into question.  It is possible that Locke based some of his theories on 
language on the seventeenth-century philosopher, Thomas Hobbes.   In his 
Leviathan, Hobbes discusses the potential “abuses” of language, which occur 
“when men register their thoughts wrong, by the inconstancy of signification of 
their words; by which they register for their conceptions, that which they never 
conceived; and so deceive themselves” (Hobbes 21).  Hobbes underscores not 
only the difficulty of linguistic representation, but more specifically, man’s lack 
of control over the use of his words, and how he often falls to self-deception while 
attempting to represent his ideas using language. 
Though philosophers like Locke and Hobbes discussed topics such as self-
identity and linguistic representation separately, a combined investigation of self-
representation was not yet in their epistemological purview.  The issue of self-
representation through autobiography was never problematized in any real and 
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direct way until the twentieth century, even though the eighteenth century “[gave] 
birth to the form, meaning, shape, and texture of the great modern 
autobiographies” (Nussbaum 6).  Before the eighteenth century, the 
autobiographical genre itself had no distinct form, even though, retroactively, we 
might identify certain works as “autobiographical.”   
Montaigne’s Essais (1580), for example, operates somewhat like an 
autobiographical text even though it was written during the Renaissance, and 
therefore, predates the actual “birth” of the form.  The opening to Essais warrants 
some examination, because in it, Montaigne presents the assumption that the self 
can adequately be represented textually:  “I want to be seen in my simple, natural, 
and ordinary guise, without straining or artifice:  for it is myself that I paint.  My 
faults will show through vividly, and my native form…I assure you that I would 
have readily painted myself in the altogether and quite naked.  Thus, reader, I am 
myself the matter of my book [Montaigne Essais]” (Wilner 7).  Montaigne 
displays confidence that his text will be aligned with truth, and assures his readers 
that he will represent himself accurately.  By asserting, “I am myself the matter of 
my book,” Montaigne equates self and text, as though both are somehow made up 
of the same physical “matter.”  It seems, then, that for Montaigne there is little 
gap between the self and the textual representation of the self.  In Feeding on 
Infinity, Joshua Wilner suggests that the passage “moves toward an identification 
of his writing with literal self-exhibition…where ‘matiere’ [matter] may be read 
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as ‘subject matter,’ but more radically…as the ‘matter’ out of which the book is 
made” (Wilner 129).  Since, for Montaigne, self and text are made from the same 
matter, self-representation through autobiography proves to be an achievable task. 
Felicity Nussbaum describes this type of thinking as “dominated by the 
assumption of a self…that can be imitated textually…There is often an 
assumption [of] a reality, hidden behind appearances…and that representation in 
autobiography corresponds to it.  In addition, these narratives presume that 
autobiographers are the source and center of the meaning of their texts” 
(Nussbaum 9).  Therefore, assuming a position of authority, autobiographical 
writers could lay claim over the power of their signifiers to adequately and 
accurately represent the true, interior essence of their identities. 
 
III 
As I have mentioned, the emergence of the autobiographical form was not 
accompanied in the eighteenth century by any explicit philosophical 
investigations into the form itself, as no one had yet published a work integrating 
the topics of selfhood and signification.  I would like to suggest, however, that the 
topic of language, identity, and self-representation was indeed brought to the 
foreground in the eighteenth century, but not by a philosopher.  Instead, Daniel 
Defoe, the journalist and author, carved out this unique position for himself 
among his contemporaries.  Defoe played an important role in eighteenth-century 
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philosophical dialogues even though, superficially, he was not himself a 
philosopher.  Chronologically falling squarely between Locke and Hume, Defoe 
contributed to, extended, and preempted the dominant philosophical discourses on 
language and identity in the eighteenth century. Defoe never published a treatise 
on the self or on language, but rather, employed the guise of fiction to extend the 
philosophical discourses of his time.  By creating protagonists who engaged in the 
process of self-writing, Defoe probed at questions of self-knowledge, 
investigating whether the self is indeed a knowable construct, and if so, how is it 
to be known?   
  Defoe’s novels subverted the myth of self-mastery presented in prior 
autobiographical works, such as Montaigne’s and Augustine’s
3
.  For Defoe, self-
mastery is defined by the three basic assumptions I outlined earlier, namely:  the 
assumptions of self-existence, self-knowledge, and self-representation.  Defoe’s 
belief that the “self” is no stable, monolithic construct was likely based on 
Locke’s.  But I would suggest that Defoe may have not been entirely in agreement 
with Locke’s views on the ontological status of the self.  Locke never denied that 
the self necessarily exists, but based on Defoe’s novels, there is some evidence 
that Defoe did not believe that the self was anything more than a discursive 
                                                          
3
 Unlike these authors, however, Defoe is careful to employ the pseudo-autobiographical form 
rather than the autobiographical form.  Charles Haskell Hinnant uses the term “pseudo-memoir” 
or “pseudo-autobiography” to describe Defoe’s tendency to “treat…fictional narrators as if they 
were real persons” (Hinnant 203).  Perhaps, for Defoe, the project of presenting fiction as though 
it is factual hints at the inherent “fictionality” of all ostensibly historical, autobiographical 
accounts.   
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construction and that identity is formed in language.  For example, the following 
passage from Defoe’s Essay upon the Public Credit (1710) seems to summarize 
his views on the self, even though the excerpt addresses the topic of credit: 
[Credit] acts all Substance, yet, is it self Immaterial:  it gives 
Motion, yet it self cannot be said to Exist:  it creates Forms, 
yet, has it self no Form; it is neither Quantity nor Quality; it 
has no Whereness, or Whenness, Scite, or Habit.  If I should 
say it is the Shadow of something that is Not, should I not 
puzzle the Thing, rather than explain it, and leave you and 
my self more in the Dark than we were before? [Defoe 8] 
(Wahrman 209-210). 
 
While this passage explicitly refers to the issue of credit, it is most centrally about 
ontology and the difficulty associated with understanding metaphysical being.  
This passage therefore has implications that extend beyond credit alone, and 
possibly allude to the self.  The relation between credit and selfhood was not 
uncommon in Defoe’s time, as anxieties about credit took the same form as 
anxieties about selfhood.  Credit as “mobile property” incited widespread distress 
for property-holders and lenders alike, due to its “imaginary” status:  “the political 
individual needed a material anchor in the form of property no less than he needed 
a rational soul” (Pocock 111).  Furthermore, since Locke had previously 
established that “every man has a property in his own person” that “no body has 
any right to but himself” (Locke, Second Treatise, 19), the relationship between 
property and selfhood was not unfamiliar to eighteenth century readers.  Defoe’s 
above passage therefore helps underscore the idea that “a sense of 
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property…could reinforce and moderate the sense of self” (Pocock 116).   Given 
Defoe’s interest in language and identity, the passage could be a testament to 
Defoe’s ability to contribute to the dominant, eighteenth-century dialogue on 
selfhood without referencing the idea explicitly.  If we were to replace the word 
“Credit” in the above passage with “The Self,” the text closely parallel the images 
of selfhood depicted in Defoe’s novels.  For Defoe, the self “acts all Substance, 
yet, is it self Immaterial:  it gives Motion, yet it self cannot be said to Exist.”  
Defoe’s notions of the self obviously do not refer simply to the human body, but 
rather to the interior, metaphysical construct, which “has it self no Form…no 
Whereness, or Whenness, Scite, or Habit.”   
Furthermore, the passage does not only address the ontological problems 
with the self, but also the difficulty of explaining such a complex entity.  Defoe 
discusses the difficulty of authorship or the complicated business of representing 
in language one’s precise, intended meaning:  “If I should say it is the Shadow of 
something that is Not, should I not puzzle the Thing, rather than explain it, and 
leave you and my self more in the Dark than we were before?”  Here, Defoe 
comments on the difficulty of representation, especially when the thing 
represented is so nebulous a construct as “credit” or the “self.”  The meaning of 
the word “credit” is not readily explainable or knowable, given its uncertain 
ontological status, so for an author—even one as successful as Defoe—to attempt 
to explain it would necessarily “puzzle the thing.” If I am correct in sensing an 
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undercurrent in this passage that extends beyond simply a discussion of credit, 
this passage would be only one among many of Defoe’s veiled attempts to discuss 
this topic of selfhood, signification, and authorship.  
 Similarly, Defoe’s pseudo-autobiographies operate dually as works of 
fiction and of literary criticism and philosophy.  According to critics Ian Watt and 
Michael McKeon, fiction and novel-writing were not yet clearly defined projects 
in the eighteenth century.  Watt, however, identifies Defoe as one of the first 
“modern” novelists, since his novels embodied modern notions of individualism 
and capitalism.   This labeling of Defoe as a novelist is a retroactive one, since 
genre boundaries were not yet developed and Defoe himself would not have 
identified as a novelist. Distinctions between history, philosophy, and fiction were 
therefore not quite recognizable by the time Defoe started writing his novels.  For 
this reason, Watt argues that “both the philosophical and the literary innovations 
must be seen as parallel manifestations” (Watt 31).  He suggests a dialectical 
reading of Locke’s and Hobbe’s discourses with Defoe’s, as all three contributed 
to rising notions of individualism in political, religious, and social spheres.  
Similarly, McKeon posits that the development of genre in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries had much to do with the newly developing distinction 
between factual data (which would later comprise historical writing) and fictional 
narratives, (later, novels).  These genre distinctions, however, coincided with 
developments in epistemology:  “By the time ‘the novel’ was beginning to be 
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accepted as the canonic term for prose fiction in the modern age, the 
epistemological transformation that is vital to its constitution as a genre had 
proceeded very far.  Long before this terminological triumph, the battle was being 
fought not in the name of the novel but first of all in that of ‘true history.’  The 
sometimes easy acceptance of ‘romance’ under the heading of ‘history’ in the late 
seventeenth-century booklists therefore must not be allowed to mask the 
concurrent confrontation between two divergent views of how to tell the truth in 
narrative” (McKeon 27).  Defoe falls under the category of authors McKeon 
highlights here, as Defoe also presented his works of “romance” or fiction “under 
the heading of ‘history.’”  To this end, Defoe’s uncertain status allowed him to 
contribute to and critique the philosophical dialogues of his time, marking out his 
own position on what constitutes a “truthful” narrative, and more specifically, 
what constitutes the “truth” of identity. 
What makes Defoe’s narrative purpose so original is his investigation into 
how language and identity are negotiated specifically by means of authorship and 
autobiography.  It is critical, then, not to read Defoe simply as a novelist.  While 
Watt argues that Defoe’s works embody all the techniques of “formal realism”
4
 
                                                          
4
 Watt’s term, “formal realism,” refers to the conditions or “procedures” that define the 
“modern” novel.  According to Watt, modernity in novel-writing has to do with “the novel’s 
mode of imitating reality” in which the novel appears to serve as a “full and authentic report of 
human experience” and “satisfy its reader with such details of the story as the individuality of the 
actors concerned, the particulars of the times and places of their actions, details which are 
presented through a more largely referential use of language than is common in other literary 
forms” (Watt 31-32).  
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that constitute novel-writing, he is careful to identify Defoe as a novelist working 
within a larger philosophical and social context that is not to be overlooked, 
especially because collectively, philosophical, social, and novelistic dialogues 
problematized and transformed prior notions of truth, individualism, and 
personhood.   
J.M. Coetzee addresses the same questions in Foe, a text which operates 
not only as a fictional reimagining of Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe and Roxana, but 
also as an extension of the original philosophical ideas on language, identity, and 
authorship embedded into the original works. The novel problematizes notions of 
signification, selfhood, and the discursive construction of identity through the 
process of autobiography.  His narrative purpose therefore parallels Defoe’s in 
real and distinct ways, as he too attempts to destabilize any positivist claims to 
self-mastery (namely the assumptions of self-existence, self-knowledge, and self-
representation). Coetzee appositely takes up from where Defoe left off in the 
eighteenth century.  Not unlike the case with Defoe, it would be somewhat of an 
oversight to ignore Coetzee’s own contributions to the post-structuralist 
discourses of his own era, which, I suggest, are heavily indebted to eighteenth-
century thinkers like Defoe.  Just as Defoe responds to and critiques the thinkers 
of his period, so too does Coetzee for his own era.  Coetzee engages with post-
structuralist thinkers such as Adrienne Rich, whose well-known poem “Diving 
into the Wreck” (1973) plays a significant role in Coetzee’s text.  The poem 
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features a narrator diving into an old shipwreck, symbolic of her troubling journey 
to discover the “truth” of the wreck as opposed to the mythology she has heard 
about the wreck.  Coetzee positions his narrator, Susan, in this role of the diver, as 
her autobiography follows the trajectory of her own journey toward self-
discovery, only to learn, in the end, the impossibility of this task.  Coetzee’s novel 
also parallels the efforts of Roland Barthes and Michel Foucault to demonstrate 
how authorial authority becomes destabilized during the act of writing and the 
idea that the author does not necessarily authorize the meaning of his text.  Foe 
also incorporates much of Lacan’s ideas on the discursive construction of identity, 
as his “Mirror Stage” and “Language of the Self” are particularly relevant to this 
post-structural reading of Foe.  While Coetzee, like Defoe, is known and 
respected as a novelist whose narrative purposes are primarily considered post-
colonial
5
, Foe serves as his own veiled contribution to the dominant post-
structuralist discourse of his era. 
IV 
  The chapters that follow are organized to chronologically represent the 
intellectual trajectory of the mono-character, starting with Crusoe, then Roxana, 
and lastly, Susan Barton. 
                                                          
5
 This is not to say, however, that there are no post-colonial implications in Foe.  Quite the 
contrary, there are many post-colonial readings of the novel which are not to be dismissed. My 
purpose, however, is to draw out the post-structural readings in Foe, which are often overlooked 
by literary critics.   
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 In the next chapter, I will attempt to demonstrate how Crusoe represents 
the earliest stage of the mono-character’s development.  Defoe handles Crusoe’s 
character with a great deal of irony. Despite Crusoe’s ability to master his external 
surroundings, Defoe represents him as somewhat delusional and unable to 
understand his own interiority.  Significantly, Crusoe misrecognizes his status as 
an author as that of an authority figure.  Crusoe, who views himself as a master 
craftsman while he is stranded on the island, believes he has the ability to carve 
his identity into anything he wants, whether it is king of the island or master of 
Friday.  Crusoe believes authorship makes him a creator of truths, rather than a 
creator of fictions.  Defoe frequently undercuts Crusoe’s authority and 
undermines his sense of selfhood, but Crusoe himself never catches on, and 
ultimately, never realizes that self-mastery is not an option.  In the end, he views 
himself as a successful author.     
  Chapter 3 will focus on Roxana, who serves as a revision of Crusoe’s 
character, bearing some striking resemblances to him while also displaying an 
intellect that is worlds beyond him.  To this end, she is the next logical step in the 
mono-character’s intellectual development.  Like Crusoe, Roxana believes in the 
existence of a true, interior self—but she does not view herself in a position of 
control over this interior identity.  Instead, she believes that the character or 
identity of the interior self is a function of external circumstances over which she 
has no control.  She becomes a “whore for bread” (Defoe, Roxana, 28) after her 
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husband abandons her with no funds left to support herself or her children.  
Throughout her life, Roxana, always accompanied by her faithful servant Amy, 
becomes the mistress of a slew of wealthy men, while stealthily acquiring massive 
amounts of wealth along the way.  She frequently changes her identity, posing as 
a Turkish Princess as well as a Quaker, knowing full well that she can control her 
outer identities, if not her inner one.  Roxana’s claims to authorship therefore take 
the figure of performance, and she recognizes that her performances are fictive by 
nature.     
 In chapter 4, I propose that Coetzee’s Susan Barton extends the 
intellectual trajectory of the mono-character instituted by Defoe.  Susan’s 
character conflates Crusoe and Roxana, and also integrates some of the plot from 
both of Defoe’s novels.  In Foe, Susan gets washed up on Cruso’s
6
 island while 
on an ocean voyage in search of her lost daughter.  She remains on the island with 
Cruso and Friday (who in Coetzee’s version is mute) until they are rescued.  
Cruso, however, does not survive the ocean voyage, and Susan and Friday return 
to England, while Susan solicits their story to be written by a novelist, named Foe 
(which is, not coincidentally, Daniel Defoe’s original name).  The novel consists 
of her letters to Foe which document her experience on the island.  But these 
letters turn out to be a form of autobiography, since she never gets a response 
from Foe and eventually stops mailing the letters.  Susan’s claims to authorship 
                                                          
6
 Coetzee drops the “e” at the end of Robinson Crusoe’s name.  
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manifest most clearly through her repeated acts of self-writing. In the beginning 
of Foe, Susan bears many resemblances to Defoe’s Crusoe, as she believes in the 
authority of language and of her words as an author.  She, too, seeks self-mastery, 
and hopes to discover the truth of her identity through the act of writing.  But by 
the end of the novel, she reaches a level of understanding about language and 
identity that surpasses even Roxana’s.  Essentially, she recognizes her identity 
(the metaphysical, authorial, and objective selves) as myths of language.  Susan is 
thus able to reach a level of awareness that Crusoe never achieves, and that Defoe 





Chapter 2:   
Signification and Selfhood:  Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe 
 
Introduction 
Representing the earliest stage in the mono-character’s intellectual 
development, Crusoe sets the stage for Defoe’s narrative project.   
In his essay, “Defoe as Narrative Innovator,” John Richetti writes that “The effect 
is to evoke an individual who is just and essentially himself…the narrative depicts 
Crusoe exploring his subjectivity” (Richetti, “Defoe as Narrative Innovator, 126).  
This emphasis on subjectivity and interiority coupled with Crusoe’s peculiar 
obsession with language makes Crusoe the center at which theories on identity 
and language intersect.  Autobiography, or the “pseudo-memoir” form, ostensibly 
allows for this linguistic “project of self-realization” (Richetti, “Defoe as 
Narrative Innovator,” 149).   More than just a novel, Robinson Crusoe amounts to 
a philosophical investigation of whether the truth of the self can be discovered in 
language, or more specifically, the language of autobiography.      
Scholars have increasingly attended to why Crusoe writes, why he 
“engages in repeated and at times almost compulsive acts of autobiography” 
(Marshall 899), and what to make of his relationship with language.  In his article, 
“The Parrot’s Voice:  Language and the Self in Robinson Crusoe,” Eric Jager 
argues that, for Crusoe, “writing is an activity of considerable benefit to him” 
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(Jager 322) and that “Crusoe’s re-construction through language, considered 
against the commonplace of the silent solitary whose verbal 
functions…deteriorate in the absence of society, displays a remarkable initiative 
to the maintenance not only of language per se but also of oneself by means of 
language” (332).  For Jager, Crusoe’s engagement with writing and autobiography 
serves a utilitarian purpose, and allows Crusoe to both escape the torture of 
solitude and maintain a sense of selfhood.  John Richetti seems to agree on this 
point, arguing that Crusoe’s “casting of accounts is as admirable a feat in his 
context as mastering the tides and building a raft…Both are analytic acts, both 
involve a separation of the self from circumstances in order to master them by co-
operating with their flow” (Richetti, Defoe’s Narratives, 40).  For both Jager and 
Richetti, Crusoe’s persistent engagement with speech, writing, accounting, and 
autobiography is a means to achieving self-mastery.  While on the one hand 
Crusoe’s self-directed speech acts and autobiographical projects may help him 
maintain his sanity in his solitary condition, this chapter suggests an alternative 
view of the role of language in Crusoe’s conception of his self-identity.   
The aim of this chapter is to call into question what many critics have 
called Crusoe’s capacity for self-mastery by means of his language.  In this 
chapter, I will investigate the extent to which Crusoe views language as an 
epistemological tool with which to discover the truth of his identity, and how 
Defoe almost always undermines Crusoe’s attempts at achieving self-mastery 
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through autobiography.  Crusoe, somewhat delusionally, believes in an 
ontological component to language; that language somehow bears an intrinsic 
connection to being itself.  Shari Benstock, in her essay “Authorizing the 
Autobiographical,” writes that “One definition of autobiography suggests that it is 
an effort to recapture the self…to know the self through ‘consciousness.’  Such a 
claim presumes that there is such a thing as the ‘self’ and that it is ‘knowable’” 
(Benstock 145-146).  Crusoe, who has been “captured” or imprisoned by the 
island and has seemingly suffered a loss of control, feels the need to regain 
control over both his external circumstances and his interior world.  To 
accomplish the latter, he attempts to “recapture” himself in writing, and believes 
this to be a manageable task.  Language, for Crusoe, authorizes the existence of 
an authentic identity—a stable, fixed sense of selfhood which lies beyond the 
signifier, or what I call, the metaphysical self. For this reason, Crusoe engages in 
various acts of speech and writing throughout the novel, which reveal this latent 
desire to establish a holistic, stable sense of selfhood—the desire that “initiates 
the autobiographical act” (146).  He writes in a journal, converses inwardly with 
himself, declares himself king and sovereign of the island—all in an attempt to 
assure himself of a verifiable and constant “truth” behind his identity, an essence 
of self.  Defoe, on the other hand, works stealthily in the background to disrupt 
such positivist claims to self-construction and self-mastery.  He treats his 
protagonist with a great deal of irony, in order to reveal to the reader, though not 
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to Crusoe himself, the impossibility of self-mastery and self-knowledge.  While 
Jager and Richetti affirm that Crusoe’s use of language allows him to gain self-
mastery, I propose instead that Crusoe’s self-maintenance is guaranteed only by 
his sustained illusions about language and identity; namely, that language verifies 
and authorizes the truth of identity.  Unlike the further characters of the mono-
character, Roxana and Susan Barton, Crusoe never comes close to realizing that 
the self may be nothing more than a discursive construct.   
 
Crusoe’s Delusions of Grandeur  
The desire for a stable sense of self makes sense for Crusoe, since, being 
cast away on the island, the threat of losing his identity is a real and genuine 
fear—either literally through death or simply by becoming an inconsequential 
“nobody” displaced from human society.  He fears being “swallowed up” (Defoe 
9) by the sea or by cannibals, and his persistent acts of speech and autobiography 
help him to combat this paranoid fear of erasure.  Crusoe’s main shortcoming, 
however, is that he never comes to realize that, while language may sustain him 
on the island, the reassurance it provides about his identity is purely illusory.  The 
self he believes to be real and knowable is merely imaginary.  Defoe drops many 
hints of this idea throughout the novel, thereby creating a sustained dramatic 
irony, as Crusoe never catches on to his own delusions.    
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The relationship between language and identity is first established at the 
very opening of Defoe’s novel, in which Crusoe introduces himself to the reader.  
Language and identity converge in the symbolic status of Crusoe's name.  He 
notes that his original name was “Robinson Kreutznaer, but by the usual 
corruption of words in England, we are now call'd, nay we call ourselves, and 
write our name Crusoe…” (5).   Here, language is used as a means to control 
identity through the traditional, yet clearly problematic, act of naming.  Language 
appears, to Crusoe, to provide a stable sense of selfhood through his name, but he 
only gives cursory attention to the fact that words so easily become corrupted and 
changed over time. Significantly, the shift from passive to active voice—“We are 
now call'd, nay we call ourselves, and write our name Crusoe”—calls attention to 
the character's desire to actively maintain control over his name and his identity 
through language, despite its inherent instability.  This shift in nominal identity, 
however, could allegorically represent the fragility and flexibility of identity 
itself.   
In the opening pages of the novel, Crusoe's character is depicted as 
anything but steady.  He fluctuates between being the “prodigal” son, who obeys 
his father and remains in a middle-class station in England, and the rebellious son 




wavering pattern…is crucial in every respect.  Not only 
Crusoe but the nature of his world are being defined.  It is a 
world where ‘nature’ (a personal, internal reality, somehow 
given) and circumstances (that is, external…historical, social 
facts) seem to be complementary causes of action.  Again, 
the self must in such a situation be both in and out of 
circumstances. Its ‘nature’ becomes a shifting and complex 
thing…sometimes sliding over into public patterns like the 
generalized figures of fiction (the rebellious son, the 
ambitious traveler, the heroic castaway, the repentant sinner 
(Richetti 26).   
 
Richetti demonstrates the extent to which the self’s internal “nature” or identity is 
at best a shape-shifting construct, and is dependent on external circumstances.  
Quite keenly, Richetti comments on Crusoe’s tendency to “slide” into different 
roles; that is, until some external force requires him to switch identities.  But 
Richetti does not investigate here the role that language plays in Crusoe’s pattern 
of shape-shifting.  When deciding whether to be the Prodigal son or rebellious 
adventurer, he changes his mind numerous times before actually setting out on a 
ship bound for London. This decision appears like a commitment to one identity 
over the other, namely, the adventurous rebel, yet he doubts his decision once the 
ship is tossed and turned about in a turbulent storm. My interest in Crusoe's 
identity crisis is not the struggle itself, but the role language plays in it. While in 
the midst of the storm, Crusoe declares, “In this agony of mind, I made many 
vows and resolutions that if it would please God to spare my life...I would, like a 
true repenting Prodigal, go home to my father” (9). In this moment of agony, 
Crusoe trusts the authority of his many “vows and resolutions” to become the 
34 
 
“true repenting Prodigal.”   But after the storm subsides and he is saved, he admits 
to having “forgot the vows and promises that I made in my distress” (10) and 
continues on with his adventures.  This is a clear example of Crusoe's reliance on 
the performative effects of speech and its perceived ability to construct his 
identity.  Clearly, he views speech as tantamount to a type of action, and believes 
that if he vows to become the Prodigal son, he actually will become one.  The 
vow is initially legitimized, for Crusoe, by the empty signifiers he recites to 
himself.  Crusoe’s vows and promises to himself operate as a form of 
autobiography, as he attempts to linguistically recreate himself as the Prodigal son 
despite the fact that there is no truth to such a statement whatsoever.  Yet even 
when his promise is revealed as a temporary outburst of emotion, he fails to 
recognize the problems with his original vow in the first place; that the words 
alone are guaranteed by nothing substantive and lack the authority they appear to 
have.  He seems unaware of the possibility that identity may not be created by 
language, but rather, as Richetti notes, determined by temporal and external 
circumstance—which, being constantly in a state of flux, leave no possibility for 
stability.   
David Marshall comments on how language so easily verifies truth and 
ontology for Crusoe.  Marshall argues that Crusoe’s first act of autobiography is 
when he inscribes the following text into the cross he has built on the island: “I 
come on shore here on the 30
th
 of September, 1659” (Defoe 52).  Though he 
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inscribes this twelve days after his arrival on the island, the text “almost reads as a 
performative
7
 speech act rather than a descriptive one, as if Robinson Crusoe has 
not really arrived on the island until he has declared himself to arrive" (Marshall 
901).  The fact that Crusoe believes language to be “performative” over 
“descriptive” verifies his faith in the creative capacity of language, as though he 
has re-created the event of his arrival in real life.  This is not to say, however, that 
language does not have such a creative capacity.  The difficulty with Crusoe is 
that he, unlike his more savvy author, does not conceive of language’s creative 
ability as a fictive function; instead, he believes that language has the ability to 
construct truth itself.    
Crusoe’s assertions of identity also come in the form of self-proclaimed 
titles and labels for himself.  Toward the end of the novel when an English ship 
appears with a crew of mutineers, Crusoe poses as governor in order to maintain 
control and sovereignty over crew and help suppress the mutiny.  The label, 
“governor” is yet another example of Crusoe's attempt to construct his identity, 
and a much inflated one at that.  But since, upon the crew’s arrival, he was not 
dressed like an English governor, “I now appeared as another person, and spoke 
                                                          
7
 Performative language, in this sense, is language that performs an action.  To this end, Crusoe’s 
documentation of his arrival on the island operates like an actual “reliving” of the event.  
Descriptive language, on the other hand, is simply explanatory.  Crusoe’s use of performative 
language indicates his belief that language and ontology somehow collapse into one another.  He 
also uses descriptive language later when writing his journal, but again, does not see the 
linguistic description as removed from truth itself.  In other words, Crusoe has trouble seeing 
what Saussure calls the “gap” between signifier and signified.      
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of the Governour, the garrison, the castle, and the like, upon all occasions” (213). 
In other words, he builds up the image of a powerful governor in the minds of the 
crew, and later, once “dress'd in my new habit” (216), he actively assumes the 
fictional role. This episode reveals Defoe’s awareness that language and identity 
are themselves somewhat theatrical by nature, rather than authentic and 
essentially real.  Language, in this scene, functions like a script and the clothes 
like a costume. The identity of the governor was first constructed fictitiously 
through Crusoe's speech act, and then theatrically performed.  This episode is 
representative of what generally occurs when Crusoe attempts to establish his 
identity through speech: he creates a role for himself, an alter ego—whether it be 
prodigal son, king, master, or governor—by speaking it into existence, and then 
goes on to perform it.  
While it is true that, in the episode with the mutineers, Crusoe is fully 
aware that his identity as governor is merely a performance to deceive the crew, 
in most other occasions, he deceives himself.  For example, he takes great 
pleasure in thinking “that this [island] was all my own, that I was king and lord of 
all this country indefeasibly, and had right of possession” (80).  Crusoe therefore 
assumes this position of control, though he never actually questions the grounds 
for such far-reaching claims.  Crusoe’s tendency to assume such a position of 
authority may operate as Defoe’s attempt to address the politically-charged 
question of what precisely authorizes authority.  Does authority lie in the 
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proclamation itself?  Is Crusoe king simply because he says so
8
? Crusoe’s use of 
self-proclaimed labels can also be viewed as a form of autobiography, and is 
therefore an example of his attempt at displaying authority through authorship.  
Eric Jager comments on this, stating:  “From his solitary role as author 
reconstructing himself in the journal, to his social role as ‘king’ and ‘governor’ 
constructing his fictional ‘Authority,’ Robinson Crusoe displays the ability to 
make and remake himself through language” (Jager 331).  While Jager views 
Crusoe’s writerly and creative abilities as an achievement, he fails to comment on 
Crusoe’s lack of awareness that this authority is purely of his own devising, and 
therefore fictional. Rewriting himself as “king and lord” of the island, he imagines 
a new identity with the hope that a title so high in status will somehow match up 
to his true self.  The statement expresses little doubt in this perceived identity as 
king, which he views as an “indefeasible” truth.  In other words, Crusoe sees no 
difference between his authorial self and his imagined, objective self.  Jager 
places little importance on this difference.  He posits that Crusoe’s journal, for 
example, helps him achieve a sustained sense of self, since “the past is both 
written and read by the same ‘I.’ The ‘irreparable tear between the written account 
and the naked, lived moment’ [Brown 588] recedes in importance when one 
                                                          
8
 The question of where political authority lies and how it is justified was increasingly important 
in Defoe’s time, just a few decades after the Restoration of the British monarchy. It is possible 
that Defoe intended to highlight the more political implications of Crusoe’s self-proclaimed “king-
like” status on the island in order to call into question the political authority of the British 
monarchy after the Restoration.    
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considers Crusoe’s journal…as a daily function that translates the self from 
mental composure to written composition, as a scene of reflexive transactions 
beneficial to Crusoe’s existence” (Jager 325).   While Jager focuses on the more 
practical effects of journal-writing, he diminishes the importance of identity-
fragmentation that, I believe, Defoe attempts to draw out.    The difference 
between the “written account” and “naked, lived moment” (Brown 588) is the 
very fissure that Defoe is problematizing.   
Extrapolating from Jacques Lacan’s, “The Mirror Stage,” George Gusdorf 
writes that autobiography “is the mirror in which the individual reflects his own 
image” (Gusdorf 33)
9
.  This is precisely how Crusoe himself conceives of his own 
autobiographical acts.  Shari Benstock, however, counters Gusdorf on this point, 
questioning “the measure to which ‘self’ and ‘self image’ might not coincide, can 
never coincide in language—not because certain forms of self-writing are not 
self-conscious enough but because they have no investment in creating a cohesive 
self over time” (Benstock 148).  There are two ways to think about Benstock’s 
point.  First, Benstock proposes that a distinction be drawn between “self” 
(metaphysical self-identity) and “self image,” (objective self-identity) and that 
these two are somewhat asymmetrical.  Crusoe does not understand that his 
                                                          
9
 Though this idea of “mirror” and the reflection of the authentic self was popularized by Lacan, it 
is possible that Defoe’s engagement with these ideas of language and representation operates as 
a response to Book III of John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding, in which Locke 
first questioned the relationship between words and reality:  “Because men would not be 
thought to talk barely of their own imagination, but of things as they really are; therefore they 
often suppose the words to stand also for the reality of things” (Locke, “On Words”).   
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imagistic self (as king) simply does not match up with his “actual” self, because 
this identity does not persist over time.  Defoe eventually reveals that the island 
does not belong to Crusoe alone, but is inhabited and frequently visited by 
cannibals.  By exposing the truth about the island's inhabitants, Defoe 
permanently disrupts Crusoe's self-identity as “king” and “lord”, and instead of 
acting king-like, Crusoe runs to the hills and hides in fear of the cannibals. The 
second way to consider Benstock’s point is to draw no distinction between “self” 
and “self image,” but rather to conceive of both as fictive constructs at the outset.  
In this second view, there is no “real” self that the “self image” must match up to; 
instead, the “real” self is, like the linguistic representation, also a construct of the 
imagination.  This line of thinking is analogous with Hume’s theory that selfhood 
consists only in memory, and that on its own, the self is nothing more than a 
bundle of perceptions.  This idea offers a further explanation for why Crusoe can 
have no “investment in creating a cohesive self over time” (148), since, in this 
second view, there is no cohesive self at all.  Crusoe seems entirely unaware of 
either of these possibilities.  But Defoe demonstrates, at the very least, that 
Crusoe's authorial desire to label himself as a king and lord does not authorize his 
actually being one.   
While the speech-acts Crusoe engages in exemplify his faith in language’s 
ability to determine identity, there is some evidence in the novel that Crusoe 
actually recognizes the limitations of speech.  It is for this reason that he does not 
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immediately assume the role of governor, and requires the costume in order to 
convince the crew of his position.  Writing, however, takes on a different status 
for Crusoe.  Because there is an element of permanence to writing, he seems to 
privilege text over speech as a more stable, reliable tool. While on the island, 
Crusoe frequently mentions his engagement with writing and the benefits of it:  “I 
found pen, ink and paper, and I husbanded them to the utmost....while my ink 
lasted, I kept things very exact” (53).  The “exactitude” offered through written 
language is significant, because it makes writing appear more substantive than 
speech alone.  The permanence of ink also adds to its value in terms of its stability 
and constancy, unlike speech which is fleeting and subject to change with time 
and circumstance.  This is why Crusoe asks that the crew sign a written contract 
verifying that they “would be entirely under and subjected to his commands” 
(195).  Recognizing that a verbal promise is less reliable than a written one, 
Crusoe clearly values writing as a means for verifying truth.     
Crusoe’s journal is his most literal attempt at autobiography and therefore 
represents his most fervent effort at writing his identity into existence. This act of 
constructing the self textually seems to support the idea that the self actually can 
be constructed and represented in language.  Jager maintains a positivist position 
regarding autobiography and the possibility of self-construction:  “the journal 
enables Crusoe to realize a cumulative sense of himself” (Jager 325).  But Crusoe 
is not actually at liberty to fully engage in this act of self-writing, because, during 
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the act of writing, he is constantly aware of his limited supply of ink.  The journal 
is therefore cut short after only a few months of writing because, “having no more 
ink, I was forc'd to leave it off” (Defoe 56).  The process of self-construction 
through the act of writing is therefore constantly tempered with the threat of the 
ink’s disappearance.  Consequently, writing no longer retains the preconceived 
permanence, legitimacy, or “exactitude” that it traditionally has. Because Defoe 
limits Crusoe’s ink, Crusoe's “self” constructed in his journal is never fully 
formed, and even the part of the self that is written is constricted for the purpose 
of conserving the ink. This is why the journal captures only the banal actions and 
events of Crusoe’s first months, rather than Crusoe himself.  Entries such as 
“Much rain all night and all day, no stirring out” (61) and “Rain all day” (61), 
though complete, daily entries, barely reveal very much about Crusoe, the man.  
Therefore, the text of the journal fails to represent or determine exactly who 
Crusoe is, as autobiographical writing intends to do.   This is not to say, however, 
that if Crusoe had an unlimited supply of ink, he could have successfully formed 
his identity; rather, the limited ink allegorically represents the limitations of 
language itself and its intrinsic incapacity to either represent or construct an 
authentic identity. 
 It is important to note that Crusoe’s journal is not simply a failed attempt 
at constructing the self textually; it is, as Marshall notes, “one of a series of 
attempts to narrate his life as the strangely non-linear narrative keeps beginning 
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again and circling back on itself—alluding to, joining with, and diverting from 
other versions of Crusoe’s autobiography” (Marshall 899).  Crusoe documents the 
written story of his arrival on the island, for example, three separate times:   first, 
chronologically in the novel's explanation of events (Defoe 38); a second time, 
when he explains his reason for keeping the journal (56); and lastly, in the journal 
itself (57)
10
.  Given that his arrival on the island is also his birthday, much 
scholarship indicates that the arrival functions as a symbolic rebirth for Crusoe.  
His reiteration of this “rebirth” may be symptomatic of a paranoid desire to be 
reborn textually, to secure an identity entirely inscribed in writing.  But across 
these three accounts, we find a very different Crusoe in each.  In the first account, 
which is the pseudo-memoir itself, Crusoe writes, “I was now landed, and safe on 
shore, and began to look up and thank God that my life was sav’d in a case 
wherein there was some minutes before scarce any room to hope” (38).  In the 
second account, Crusoe for the first time demonstrates some self-conscious 
apprehensions about writing and autobiography:   
And now it was when I began to keep a journal of every 
day’s employment, for indeed at first I was in too 
much…discomposure of mind, and my journal would ha’ 
been full of many dull things.  For example, I must have said 
thus:  Sept. the 30
th
.  After I got to shore and had escap’d 
drowning, instead of being thankful to God for my 
deliverance, having first vomited with the great quantity of 
salt water…and recovering myself a little, I ran about the 
                                                          
10
 David Marshall also views Crusoe’s inscription on the cross stating his arrival as a form of 
autobiography (Marshall 906)—which would therefore serve as a fourth written account of 
Crusoe’s arrival on the island.   
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shore…crying out, I was undone, undone…I was forced to 
lie down on the ground to repose, but durst not sleep for fear 
of being devour’d (56).        
     
Notice first of all that this is not a precise documentation of Crusoe’s arrival, but 
rather an imaginative hypothesis of what he “must have said” in his journal.  
Secondly, in this moment of recollection, he imagines a very different scenario 
from the one presented first in the chronological account of the novel.  In the first 
account, the first thing Crusoe does is “look up and thank God that my life was 
sav’d” (38), while in the second, “instead of being thankful to God for my 
deliverance…I ran about the shore…” (56). While Crusoe does admit that when 
writing the journal he must have been in a “discomposure of mind,” he believes 
that the result of such discomposure is that “my journal would ha’ been full of 
many dull things” (56).  He therefore does not account for the fact that the two 
stories he presents clearly contradict each other, and present two very different 
Crusoes.  The third account in the journal makes no mention of either thanking 
God or vomiting and running about the shore.  He simply writes that “I poor 
miserable Robinson Crusoe, being shipwrecked, during a dreadful storm…came 
on shore on this dismal unfortunate island…All the rest of that day I spent in 
afflicting my self at the dismal circumstances I was brought to…and in despair of 
any relief, saw nothing but death before me” (57).  The journal account seems to 
document Crusoe’s interior feelings, unlike the second, which describes his 
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particular actions upon arrival.  He also writes in the journal that, “I slept in a 
tree…but slept soundly tho’ it rain’d all night” (57) which clearly contradicts the 
second account, in which Crusoe lies down, not in a tree, but “down on the 
ground,” but he “durst not sleep for fear of being devour’d” (56). 
 It is less important, for my purposes, to examine the factual variances in 
these three accounts of Crusoe’s arrival; what is more significant is that in these 
three separate scenarios, we find three different Crusoes entirely; distinct 
identities that shift in their representation.  While one could argue that the 
separate accounts attempt to capture different aspects of the same event, as one 
recounts the physical events and another his interior feelings, it is still difficult to 
overlook the inconsistencies.  Patricia Meyer Spacks argues that the variances 
across the three accounts demonstrate that “a writer’s immediate purpose 
determines his literary choices” and that “Defoe…reinforces Crusoe’s implicit 
contention that the process of recording—a process of selecting and preserving 
images on the basis of their significance—helps a man to come to terms with his 
experience” (Spacks 33).  Like Jager, Spacks diminishes the fragmentations and 
inconsistencies that occur during the writing-process for the sake of highlighting 
how writing is actually beneficial to “coming to terms with” experience.  I 
suggest, on the other hand, that it is likely that Defoe intended to produce some 
discomfort in his readers with these varied accounts, causing them to question the 
reliability of his protagonist.  And it is worth repeating that such variances in 
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representation must not be overlooked.  In the first account, Crusoe is clearly 
described as having a sort of religious and spiritual experience, thankful for his 
deliverance by God, while in the second, God plays no role in his arrival 
whatsoever.  If the novel, the pseudo-autobiographical account, is written in a 
moment of recollection on Crusoe’s part, we must question how the act of 
recollection could influence the “Crusoe” formed in the novel.  For instance, 
Crusoe’s conversion occurs later in the novel, but Crusoe the 
author/autobiographer is already converted by the time he writes the novel, so it 
makes sense that he would manufacture an identity that arrives on the island 
spouting thanks to God.  David Marshall writes that “the strange interweaving of 
Crusoe’s past and present autobiographical narratives and the repetition of 
autobiographical speech acts throughout the text contribute to the sense that the 
narrative of the Life [and Adventures of Robinson Crusoe] begins over and over 
again” (Marshall 903).  If Crusoe’s repeated accounts of his arrival on the island 
allegorize his rebirth, it becomes evident that Crusoe the author/autobiographer 
“gives birth” to a number of different Crusoes by means of his language.  
Benstock comments on this fragmentation between the autobiographer and the 
multiple selves depicted in the text:   
the writing subject is the one presumed to know 
(himself)…The chain-link fence that circumscribes his 
unique contributions is language, representative of the very 
laws to which this writing subject has been subjected; that is, 
language is neither an external force nor a “tool” of 
46 
 
expression, but the very symbolic system that both constructs 
and is constructed by the writing subject.  As such, language 
is both internal and external, and the walls that defend the 
moi [me] are never an entirely adequate defense network 
against the multiple forms of the je [I] (Benstock 149).     
 
Benstock implicitly references in this passage the three assumptions underlying 
the autobiographical process that I outlined in the previous chapter: that there is a 
self; that it is knowable; and that it can be adequately represented in language.  
She also mentions a fourth assumption that is equally relevant; namely that the 
self is also a unified and essentially monolithic entity.  Crusoe, the 
author/autobiographer who is writing retroactively must have made these 
assumptions in order to begin the writing process without realizing how the 
language system itself both contributes to and disrupts the process of imaginative 
self-construction.  Defoe therefore demonstrates how Crusoe misreads language, 
and seems unaware of its function as the “very symbolic system that both 
constructs and is constructed” by Crusoe as author.  In other words, while he 
attempts to maintain narrative control over his textual, objective self, he cannot 
grasp the ways in which the textual self is not only constructed by him, but by 
language itself, which imposes its own limitations on the author.  Benstock 
comments on this lack of control on the part of the author, arguing that “language 
is both internal and external”:  while the author’s linguistic project ostensibly 
appears an “internal” or private process, in which the author seems to control the 
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signifiers he uses, language still imposes an external force on the author, given its 
inherently unstable, fragmented nature.   
Crusoe’s faith in the stability of language guarantees his faith in the 
possibility of a stable, unified self born out of language.  Mistakenly, he assumes 
that “an infinitely varied but unified self exists, and that writing and reading 
autobiography is morally and aesthetically rewarding” (Nussbaum 2). He does not 
realize the ways in which language operates against him, as it offers no unity, 
coherence, or stability.  For this reason, the object in the text, “moi,” has no 
“adequate defense network” against the multiple “je” or “I’s” that constitute the 
writing subject. Crusoe’s particular case exemplifies Defoe’s ability to traverse 
deeply philosophical terrain.  As I have already mentioned, prior to Defoe, there 
were few known dialogues or treatises that examined selfhood in relationship to 
signification.  Defoe therefore played a specific role in the epistemological 
transformation of the eighteenth century.  Essentially, he applied Locke’s 
language theories (on the language system’s lack of coherence and stability) to the 
issue of identity—thereby revealing how identity itself suffers the same fissures 
and discontinuities as the language that represents it.  
 
Crusoe’s Conversion and Spiritual Autobiography 
While Defoe calls into question such faith in the stability of language and 
the coherence of the self, it is necessary to investigate where this faith originally 
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derives from, and more important for my investigation, where does Crusoe’s faith 
in signification and selfhood derive from?  Crusoe does not display this faith at all 
times.  In fact, when he arrives on the island, he asks the existential questions 
expected of one in his condition:  “What am I, and all the other creatures, wild 
and tame, human and brutal, and whence are we?” (Defoe 74).  Here, Crusoe 
displays some uncertainty about what precisely constitutes the self, if anything, 
and admits that he does not know exactly what the “self” is
11
.  What, then, 
eventually led him to such certainty about the truth of the self and of language?   
 I propose that Crusoe’s faith in signification and selfhood derives from 
two, related events: (1) his reading of the Bible and (2) his subsequent religious 
conversion. Reading the Bible initiates religious conversion for Crusoe, and 
conversion, I will attempt to show, is essentially an autobiographical 
experience—a re-writing of the interior identity from sinner to man-of-faith.  As 
David Marshall argues, “the conversion experience authorizes… autobiography” 
(Marshall 904-905).  In other words, Crusoe’s conversion motivates him to 
engage in further autobiographical acts. If he can re-write himself as a man-of-
faith, why not also a king, lord, and governor?  Conversion therefore still requires 
the assumption of control.  While, in Puritan terms, conversion is viewed as a gift 
                                                          
11
 This doubt may explain his urge to write in the journal, possibly as an effort to convince himself 
of a unified self-identity underlying the physical body, which is knowable enough to be 
transposed in language.  But because he is able to ask the question, “What am I?” even after he 
writes in the journal, there is some indication that even the act of journal-writing does not 
convince him of a stable sense of self. However, Crusoe the author/autobiographer who writes 
retroactively is undoubtedly convinced by the time he writes his autobiography. 
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of divine grace, it is possible that Defoe means to undermine this idea, and 
highlight the extent to which conversion operates more like the autobiographical 
experience.  In doing so, he demonstrates how the self initiates conversion, rather 
than God.  Crusoe, who spent most of his early days on the island “pensive and 
sad” (75) wants only to be happy, and in order to maintain sanity, he transforms 
his interior identity (at least in his mind) from a self-loathing sinner to a religious 
penitent.  While he attributes his conversion to God, it is actually a product of 
Crusoe’s own authorship and autobiography
12
.   
 G.A. Starr views Crusoe’s reading of the Bible and subsequent 
conversion as the major turning point in the novel (Starr 111).  Starr initially 
popularized the idea of Defoe’s narratives as “spiritual autobiography.”  In Defoe 
and Spiritual Autobiography, Starr defines the term as a journalistic account of 
one’s spiritual self:  “Since every man is responsible for the well-being of his own 
soul, he must mark with care each event or stage in its development” (Starr 5).  
Spiritual autobiography therefore centers on the development of one’s interior, 
spiritual journey.  For my purposes, however, I focus mainly on Crusoe’s 
conversion as a form of spiritual autobiography, so as to emphasize the primacy 
of the role of language in the conversion process.   
                                                          
12
 The occasion parallels Crusoe’s former act of scattering corn grain outside his house, then 
attributing the growth of the corn a month later not to himself, but to God.   He believes at first 
“that God had miraculously caus’d this grain to grow without any help of seed” (Defoe 63), 
having forgotten that the seeds were scattered by his own hand a month earlier, not God’s. 
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The problematic role that language plays in both Bible-reading and 
conversion remains largely unaccounted for in current scholarship.  I propose that 
Crusoe’s reading of the Bible permanently alters his engagement with language, 
further verifies its authority, and has significant implications for his own acts of 
autobiography.  Eric Jager discusses Crusoe’s conversion, but marginalizes the 
role of language, and like many critics, does not seem to view its role as 
necessarily problematic.  For example, Jager cites J. Paul Hunter, who 
intellectualizes Crusoe by claiming that by means of the conversion, “Defoe 
dramatizes Crusoe’s mental development through his heightened awareness of 
language, for words which Crusoe had previously used carelessly now become 
meaningful to him” (Hunter 159).  Hunter is correct in noting that Crusoe’s 
engagement with the Bible changes his relationship with language, and that words 
become more meaningful to Crusoe after he converts
13
, but that is precisely 
Crusoe’s problem.  Following conversion, Crusoe believes strongly in the power 
of signification, and maintains steady faith that words are somehow charged with 
meaning and truth; it is precisely this myth that, I believe, Defoe attempts to 
subvert.  Crusoe’s conversion narrative therefore exemplifies another one of 
Defoe’s attempts to problematize meaning and language, rather than affirm its 
authority.   
                                                          
13
 Although, prior to reading the Bible, Crusoe had already displayed some faith in the authority 
of language, evinced by his persistent belief in his verbal promises and self-labels.   
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Before Crusoe begins reading the Bible, he wavers between lamenting his 
dismal, solitary conditions on the island and glorifying his circumstance as an act 
of God’s mercy, since he was the sole survivor of the shipwreck.  Not unlike his 
prior oscillation between prodigal son and rebellious adventurer, Crusoe, now on 
the island, is once again faced with the decision of who he wants to be:  an 
ungrateful sinner or a gracious man-of-faith.  Having fallen gravely ill and 
increasingly depressed, Crusoe exclaims: “Why has God done this to me?  What 
have I done to be thus us’d?” (Defoe 74).  But then, almost in the same breath, he 
scolds himself:  “WRETCH! dost thou ask what thou has done!...Why is it that 
thou wert not long ago destroy’d?” (75). Crusoe finds the answer to the question 
of his identity in the Bible.  When he starts to read, “only having open’d the book 
casually, the first words that occurr’d to me were these, Call on me in the day of 
trouble, and I will deliver thee, and thou shalt glorify me” (75).  He explains 
further that “the words were very apt to my case, and made some impression upon 
my thoughts at the time of reading them” (76).  Crusoe begins to seriously 
internalize the words of the Bible, as they seem to be charged with religious 
significance.  As he begins to read “every morning and every night…I found my 
heart more deeply and sincerely affected with the wickedness of my past life” 
(77). Not long after, Crusoe assumes the identity of a man of faith, and writes that 
the Bible has allowed him “to come to a true sense of things” (78).  Crusoe 
believes that his reading of the Bible led to his religious conversion, which in turn 
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put an end to his mental disorder, or specifically, his pattern of wavering back and 
forth between sinner and man-of-faith.  Crusoe’s Bible-reading and religious 
conversion appear to offer him a sense of stability regarding his identity, since the 
comfort he feels is entirely interior:  “My Condition began now to be…not less 
Miserable as to my Way of living, yet much easier to my Mind…I had a great 
deal of comfort within” (Defoe 77-78).   
The Bible is therefore the source of truth, comfort, and stability.  The book 
undoubtedly holds powerful significance for Crusoe in its ability to represent the 
truth and also to orient him toward the truth of his identity as a man-of-faith.  The 
Bible therefore affirms the truth-telling capacity of language for Crusoe, and 
invests authority into the word.  The reading-process, I believe, then initiates the 
writing process, because now fully convinced of the truth of language, Crusoe has 
no reason to doubt his own signifiers. In other words, reading the Bible authorizes 
Crusoe’s own use of words in his autobiography.  For this reason, Crusoe’s 
conversion is the turning point at which he begins to have steady faith not only in 
God and the words of the Bible, but in himself and his own language.  When 
Crusoe asks, “What am I?” he is not in search of his physical self or body, whose 
existence he has no doubts about.  Instead, he is in search of his identity—a 
stable, metaphysical self beyond the body, invisible to his empirical eye.  And for 
Crusoe, if God’s identity can be found in the words of the Bible, his personal 
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identity can be found in his own language; and it is this realization that initiates 
the autobiographical act.   
David Marshall notes that Crusoe’s conversion echoes that of Augustine, 
who, in his autobiographical Confessions, writes that he “hears a chanting that 
instructs him to ‘Take up and read; take up and read,’ and opening the Bible to the 
words of Paul, he reads a passage that seems to speak to him directly” (Marshall 
905).  Marshall keenly notes that Crusoe, too, describes how he “took up the 
Bible and began to read” (Defoe 75).  Crusoe, like Augustine, also believes that 
these words speak directly to him, as “the words were very apt to my case” (76); 
and later, when he opens the Bible again, Crusoe believes quite strongly that 
“these words were to me” (91).  Therefore, the act of reading the Bible, reinforces 
not only the truth of God, but the truth of the existence of the spiritual self, whom 
this newfound knowledge is impressed upon.  For Marshall, “Crusoe’s 
conversion, echoing Augustine’s conversion…takes place in a chain of 
autobiographies” (Marshall 905).  Marshall argues here that Crusoe’s conversion 
experience is intrinsically tied to his autobiographical experience, so that 
conversion is not only an act of finding God in language (specifically the 
language of the Bible) but finding the self.  Notice, for example, that finding faith 
in God leads Crusoe immediately to turn inward:  “I daily read the word of God, 
and apply’d all the comforts of it to my present state.  One morning being very 
sad, I open’d the Bible upon these words, I will never, never leave thee, nor 
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forsake thee, immediately it occurred, that these words were to me” (Defoe 90-
91).  Crusoe therefore uses the Bible as a vehicle by which to turn inward and 
examine his own interiority; but to do so is to also assume that there is, in fact, a 
spiritual, metaphysical self to turn toward.   
Conversion also motivates autobiography for Crusoe, because it allows 
him to re-examine his past life of which God and religion played no part, and 
therefore fashion a new life and “self”—a spiritual rebirth:   
…beginning at the New Testament, I began seriously to read 
it…It was not long after I set seriously to this work, but 
found my heart more deeply and sincerely affected with the 
wickedness of my past life…I threw down the book, and… I 
cried out to Jesus…thou exalted prince and savior, give me 
repentance! This was the first time that I could say, in the 
true sense of the words, that I pray’d in all my life…Now I 
look’d back upon my past life with such horror…that my 
soul sought nothing of God, but deliverance…And I add this 
part here, to hint to whoever shall read it, that whenever they 
come to a true sense of things, they will find deliverance 
from sin much greater blessing than deliverance from 
affliction.  But leaving this part, I return to my journal 
(Defoe 77-78).      
     
Crusoe’s “serious” reading of the Bible allows him, at least ostensibly, to give 
birth to an entirely new Crusoe, and as Marshall writes, it is “the rebirth of 
conversion” that “makes the retrospective reflections of autobiography possible” 
(Marshall 906).  Crusoe’s prayer itself operates like a form of autobiography, as it 
is also a type of language that urges the internal self toward its own refashioning.  
After finding God and his new self by means of the Bible, he believes he has been 
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given access to truth, allowing him to no longer ask questions such as, “What am 
I?” (74). It is this certainty about the self which motivates him to write the 
autobiography, as immediately after these lines declaring his newfound truth and 
deliverance by God, he writes, “I return to my journal.”  The authority and truth 
of Crusoe’s language, as an author and autobiographer, is thus guaranteed to him 
based on his faith in the authority of God and the Bible:  “God authors the events 
in Crusoe’s life…and the recognition of this authorizes Crusoe to write his own 
autobiography” (Marshall 903).       
But if conversion is an autobiographical experience, like any 
autobiographical work, the writing (or conversion) process does not come without 
its own problems.  Following his conversion, Crusoe displays a great deal of 
confidence in the new person he has become; one who is thankful and blessed in 
his circumstances, since they were ordained not by chance, but by God:  “Thus I 
liv’d mighty comfortable, my mind being entirely composed by resigning to the 
will of God” (108).  Crusoe never expresses any doubt in the success of his 
conversion, but years later, when chancing upon a terrifying human footprint in 
the sand, he exclaims:  “Thus my fear banish’d all my religious hope, all that 
former confidence in God, which was founded upon such wonderful experience as 
I had had of his goodness, now vanish’d” (124).  If anything has remained steady 
about Crusoe’s character, it is his tendency to waver back and forth between 
various identities.  To Crusoe’s credit, he even takes note of this wavering pattern 
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momentarily:  “How strange a checquer work of Providence is the life of 
man!…To day we love what to morrow we hate; to day we seek what to morrow 
we shun; to day we desire what to morrow we fear” (124).  Defoe’s own voice 
comes through most vividly here, clearly commenting on the instability of 
identity.  But for Crusoe, this moment of clarity is short-lived, as he eventually 
goes back to Scripture to regain his former security of both God and self:  “I took 
up my Bible, and…It is impossible to express the comfort this gave me…I 
thankfully laid down the book, and was no more sad” (125).   
The conversion process, like the autobiographical process, reveals itself to 
be anything but reliable, yielding no stable identity. Still, Crusoe continues to 
“convert” himself into any identity he chooses, unaware that these identities—
whether king, lord, governor, master, or Christian—are momentary fictions and 
functions of his imagination, rather than any interior truth. Spacks also 
emphasizes the primacy of Crusoe’s imagination, especially in relation to his 
spiritual development.  Spacks, however, views Crusoe’s imagination as a 
strength and resource to him on the island, not unlike Jager and Richetti.  She 
maintains that “the tale of how a man painfully enlarges his emotional capacities 
by using the resources of his imagination is not the story Defoe claims to tell, but 
the power of Crusoe’s narrative derives largely from its roots in just such a drama 
of self-discovery…The imagination through its own energy helps release the trap 
of self” (Spacks 29).  For Spacks, Crusoe’s imagination is the key to his eventual 
57 
 
self-mastery and self-knowledge, as his “dramatic development derives from 
increasing self-awareness” (50).  Spacks presents an image of Crusoe that he 
himself would probably endorse. Few critics would deny that Crusoe is a highly 
imaginative character, but I believe Crusoe’s imaginative capacity, or what I been 
calling his authorial abilities, actually deceive him and cause him to buy into the 
myth of stable selfhood, authorized through a seemingly reliable language system.    
While Spacks is correct that Crusoe’s imagination contributes to his sense 
of self, she (like Crusoe himself) does not read his various and short-lived 
identities as purely fictive or linguistic constructs.  Autobiography, for Spacks, 
operates as a more or less stable means of asserting the truth of identity.  She 
confirms that “spiritual autobiography can reveal the intricacies of the 
imagination…a force thus defining [Crusoe’s] ultimate identity” (Spacks 56).  
Spacks seems to be in agreement with Jager, who also argues that Crusoe’s 
engagement with language and autobiography help sustain his sanity on the island 
and eventually allows him to achieve self-mastery.  A number of critics have 
therefore argued that Crusoe’s language essentially saves him on the island, as it 
is his faith in the Bible, God, and his own acts of autobiography that help him to 
combat the discomposure of a solitary existence.  Language, for such critics and 
for Crusoe himself, serves a utilitarian purpose.  But to see language in only these 
terms results ultimately in a misreading of language itself.  This misreading 
combined with his misguided faith in his authority as author eventually drives him 
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to continuously “compos[e] himself through protean metamorphoses,” though he 
“never seems to arrive at a final or stable identity that could provide an 
authoritative or definitive stance from which to look back” (Marshall 906).  
Though the novel could serve as a testament to Crusoe’s success as author and his 
ability to represent the truth of his identity—“a history of fact…[with] no 
appearance of fiction in it” (Defoe, “Preface”)—Defoe demonstrates throughout 
the course of the novel how the act of writing engages only with ideas, or as 
Locke argues, how words “stand for ideas in the mind” and not truth itself (Locke, 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, “Of Words”).  Using Crusoe, Defoe 
questions whether identity is also merely an idea, a construct conceived in 
language which no amount of authorial authority could verify as essentially real 
or true.   
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Chapter 3:   
Authorship in the Figure of Performance:  Defoe’s Roxana   
 
Introduction  
Most critics agree that Roxana occupies a unique position among Defoe’s 
protagonists.  Richetti, G.A. Starr, and David Blewett have helped to generate a 
prevalent discourse on Roxana, attributing the novel’s uniqueness to its dark, 
deeply disturbed, and damned anti-heroine. To this end, some critics have been 
quick to label Crusoe as a hero of self-mastery and Roxana an anti-heroine of self-
destruction.  Roxana, however, is not the complete antithesis of Crusoe.  
Representative of the second phase in the mono-character’s development, Roxana 
bears some striking parallels with him.   
Significantly, both characters believe in the existence of a “true” interior, 
metaphysical self, while Defoe, working in the background, offers evidence to the 
contrary.  Throughout most of the novel, Roxana is convinced that her “true,” 
interior identity is that of a whore.   This is what Maddox calls her “‘private self’ 
which she at one point calls the ‘Secret Hell within’” [Defoe 305] (Maddox 674).  
Her character thus mimics Crusoe’s, in that she also assumes that the “truth” of 
the self necessarily exists and that it is knowable.  Unlike Crusoe, however, she 
does not believe that this truth of the self can be adequately represented in 
language.  Therefore, what distinguishes Roxana from Crusoe, and what positions 
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her above Crusoe’s intellectual level, is that she believes that the truth of the self 
exists outside any forms of representation, and that even as author to her story, 
she has no authorial control over who she really is.  Unlike Crusoe, Roxana 
believes that the interior self is formed not in language, but by external 
circumstances over which she has no control.  She becomes a “whore for bread” 
(Defoe 28), sinning only for the sake of survival.  But in doing so, she believes 
she permanently alters her interior self. 
What also distinguishes Roxana’s intellect from Crusoe’s is her awareness 
of her precarious status as author, narrator, and autobiographer of her identity. 
She recognizes that being an author grants her the authority not to construct the 
truth of the self, but rather, to create external, fictional representations of the self.  
Ironically, after recognizing the limits of authorship, Roxana attempts to explore 
the full range of her authorial abilities by perpetually re-inventing herself through 
various measures of linguistic performance.  Roxana’s authorial and 
autobiographical abilities manifest most clearly through her various 
performances, and indeed, authorship takes the figure of performance in Roxana’s 
narrative.  Her dresses, equipages, masks, and words are the collective symbols 
that constitute the text of her performed identities.  It is important to note that 
performance, for Roxana, is essentially fictive, and manifests only inauthentic 
representations of her “true” identity.   Throughout the course of the novel, she 
shifts her identity numerous times, taking on the famous role of the Turkish 
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princess, a high-class courtesan, a Quaker, etc.  Roxana recognizes each identity 
as a separate experiment in performance, unlike Crusoe who calls himself King of 
the island and actually believes his own fictions.  It is over her fictive selves that 
Roxana attempts self-mastery.   
Throughout most of the story, Roxana thinks the figure of identity is one 
she can easily apprehend. She perceives her identity as a two-fold structure
14
:  a 
private self (or “Hell within”) that she has no power to control, overladen by a 
public self, made up of multiple fictional personae which, as an author, she can 
control. By the end of the novel, Defoe undercuts both of these assumptions, and 
suggests that the structure of the self is not to be readily known
15
.  While Roxana 
perceives identity as a more complicated structure than Crusoe, her thoughts on 
identity are still too binary and simplistic for Defoe, who seems to view the self as 
a deeply complex construct that poses various ontological difficulties as to its 
existence, knowability, and representability. Defoe undermines the idea that 
Roxana has a distinct, knowable center to her identity
16
.  He also implies that 
Roxana’s performances may not merely be inauthentic postures that divide her 
“performed” self from her “real” self.  Instead, he explores how the logic behind 
this binary operates, and by the end of the novel, exposes this logic as largely 
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 This differs significantly from Crusoe, who views his identity as a more or less unified structure, 
unaware of the many ways in which his own self becomes fragmented over time. 
15
 If Defoe’s narrative technique is, as Maddox suggests, a system of subverting his protagonist’s 
claims to self-mastery, Roxana is one of Defoe’s most poignant examples of a protagonist’s 
inability to achieve self-mastery.   
16
 Though he does press this knowledge upon her until the end of the novel. 
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untenable.  Defoe seems to deconstruct the idea that “fact” and “fiction” or truth 
and lies are such distinct, stable constructs.  Identity, being a highly complex 
thing, may be the seat at which all logic distinguishing fact from fiction collapses 
completely.  It is to this extent that Roxana operates within the largely 
epistemological framework of the eighteenth century.  Just as genre boundaries 
that distinguished fact from fiction were beginning to materialize, investigations 
into truth and falsehood were also at large.  And just as meaning and “truth” 
cannot be found within texts, neither can they be located within the structure of 
identity.  Roxana’s story may suggest, then, that identity also operates like a text, 
which in her case, manifests through her many guises and performances.  Identity, 
for Defoe, is a story with no central truth.   
While Roxana may not grasp all of Defoe’s nuances regarding identity, 
her intelligence is still noteworthy.  She does believe in a stable “truth” to her 
identity, which, in her mind, cannot be changed, but as I mentioned earlier, she 
has a more enlightened view of authorship than Crusoe.  She does not see herself 
as capable of controlling the “truth” of her “self,” because she does not believe 
the truth of the self can be discovered in language.  Language, to Roxana, is a tool 
for creating fictions, not truths.  It is necessary to question why Roxana engages 
in the act of autobiography, then, if she does not believe that the self can be 
discovered in language.  I suggest that Roxana writes the autobiography because 
she recognizes herself as a talented author of fictional identities, and the novel is 
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only one among many of her autobiographical acts.  Her theatrical performances 
(as Turkish princess, Quaker, etc.) can also be read as forms of autobiography, 
since they are all fictive acts of self-reinvention.  To this end, Roxana can be 
described not as an anti-heroine per se, but rather as one of the more successful 
and self-aware of Defoe’s autobiographers, because she understands both the 
purpose and the limitations of authorship and autobiography.  
But, as I have mentioned, Roxana is not the philosophical ideal of the self-
aware author for Defoe.  While she understands the limits of authorship and that 
her status as an author does not permit her leverage over truth, one of her major 
downfalls is her belief in an underlying, “secret” truth to her identity that she must 
keep hidden:  “She believes she is really a whore rather than a loveable lady; 
really a carcass rather than a beautiful body” (Maddox 675).  While the truth of 
her identity is abominable to her, it is a truth nonetheless. In an attempt to keep 
this identity secret, there is some indication that she, like Crusoe, takes her role as 
author to an extreme, and her attempts to mask her “true” identity behind various 
performances become increasingly problematic.  Just as Defoe prevents Crusoe 
from exploring the full range of his authorship, he disrupts Roxana’s belief that 
she can allow such fictions to take over her life.  But in the end, all that is left of 
her identity is a vacancy, a palimpsest written over by various personae and 
stories.  Perhaps, Defoe would say that identity is nothing more than such a 
vacancy.  This paper is mostly in agreement with the claim originally posed by 
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Maddox, that Roxana “is a personality with an appalling missing center” (Maddox 
674), except that I would add that Defoe’s ideas on this “missing center” refer not 
only to the specific case of Roxana, but to Crusoe, Moll, and all speaking subjects 
at large.  Furthermore, the problem is not so much that the self has a “missing” 
center, but rather that there is no “center” to the self to begin with
17
.   
 
The Theater of Identity  
  The opening pages to Roxana’s autobiography require a close 
examination, not unlike Crusoe’s. Roxana, however, never mentions her name or 
its origins as Crusoe does.  Instead, she begins her autobiography, “I was born, as 
my Friends told me, at the City of Poictiers…in France, from whence I Was 
brought to England” (Defoe 5).  Julie Crane comments on this passage, arguing 
that, “the qualification ‘as my Friends told me’ might be…a mere convention, 
casting no doubt upon a sound enough assertion of ancestry; yet who can tell, in 
retrospect, where Roxana came from?” (Crane 12).  Crane makes an astute 
observation about the immediate mysteriousness surrounding Roxana’s character 
and origins, but Roxana’s commentary on language and its relationship to identity 
must not be overlooked.  Roxana cannot verify the certainty of her own birth for 
her reader, because she recognizes that the only means for “verifying” facts about 
the self and its origins is through language and stories.  The opening line therefore 
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 This is what Coetzee calls “pain of lack” rather than the “pain of loss” in Foe (Coetzee 91).   
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raises an implicit question about the knowability of the self, and more 
importantly, the medium by which one gains self-knowledge.  Roxana 
problematizes not only autobiography here, but its counterpart in historiography.  
She does not take facts about her life for granted, displaying an acute 
understanding that “our access to a material reality is always mediated by 
language…What is at stake is, in part, the claim of objectivity in traditional 
historiography or whether ‘real’ or ‘true’ history can be known” (Nussbaum 12).  
Unlike Crusoe, whose religious faith grants authority to the word, Roxana seems 
suspicious of language’s claims to truth and objectivity
18
.        
 In the introduction, Defoe continues to characterize language not as a 
medium by which to access truth, but rather, a tool for Roxana’s fictive 
performances. Having moved as a child from France to England as a refugee, 
Roxana writes, “I retain’d nothing of France, but the language” (Defoe 5).  Even 
though Roxana is not French, she is able to pose as French when she moves to 
Paris.  Similarly, though she is not English,  
I learnt the English Tongue perfectly well, with all the 
Customs of the English Young-Women; so that I retain’d 
nothing of French but the speech; nor did I so much as keep 
any Remains of the French Language tagg’d to my Way of 
Speaking, as most foreigners do, but spoke what we call 
Natural English, as if I had been born here (Defoe 6).   
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 Roxana’s intelligence comes through vividly here in the introduction, possibly because the 
voice in this section is that of the older Roxana who reflects back on her former self.  The novel 
features the voice of the older narrator speaking retroactively alongside the younger Roxana 
who, while cunning, is less philosophically savvy than her older counterpart.  Roxana as narrator 




Two important points about Roxana come into focus in this passage.  First, Defoe 
is reluctant to provide any stable answers about Roxana’s identity.  Her ethnicity 
cannot be grounded firmly in either France or England, since being born in the 
former and raised in the latter, the singularity or purity of her identity is 
questionable from the outset.  Secondly, Roxana takes pride in the fact that she 
can pass herself off as a true Englishwoman, even though she is a foreigner.  This 
is one of her first performances.  She even describes her parents as “People of 
better Fashion” rather than “the People call’d Refugees at that Time” (Defoe 5) so 
that even though she and her parents were refugees, their fashionable tendencies 
allowed them to masquerade as normal Englishman.  Julie Crane writes that 
Roxana’s introduction “prepare[s] us for some of Roxana’s most salient 
characteristics, and for her ultimate tragedy, which is partly a tragedy of language:  
her simultaneous desire to be both known and thoroughly assimilated” (Crane 16).  
While Crane emphasizes Roxana’s desire to assimilate, I would also stress 
Roxana’s intense focus on appearances and theatricality; her desire is not 
necessarily to “thoroughly assimilate,” because to do so would require her identity 
to be fully integrated into her surroundings.  Roxana, however, only cares that she 
appears as if she belongs.  Further on in her introduction, she describes her young 
self as “quick and smart in Discourse,” (Defoe 6) demonstrating her skill with 
language, and possibly foreshadowing her abilities as a linguistic performer.  She 
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frequently mentions her performative talents as a child, explaining that ‘I 
danc’d…naturally, lov’d it extremely, and sung well also, and so well that…it 
was afterwards some Advantage to me” (6).  The advantages of her artistic talents 
are not to be taken literally here, but rather serve as a precursor to her capabilities 
as a performer with the skill of artifice – a skill that is required of all authors as 
well.  
Despite Roxana’s natural propensity for artifice, she still believes in an 
underlying truth to her identity.  In the beginning of the novel, Roxana believes 
her identity is in line with normative, Christian morality. When Amy suggests that 
Roxana become a “whore for bread,” (Defoe 28) Roxana responds, “I’d die before 
I would consent, or before you should consent for my sake” (29).  Clearly, the 
young Roxana displays less self-awareness than her older, narrating self.  She 
resembles Crusoe here, believing that such vows and declarations guarantee the 
truth of her virtuous identity.  In these early stages of her development, she seems 
unaware of her capacity to deviate from Christian norms.  Amy, often considered 
Roxana’s alter ego, eventually convinces Roxana to bed the landlord, and Roxana 
is driven from a life of Christianity to one of sin.  In doing so, she inverts 
Crusoe’s conversion story by “[giving] myself up to the Devil” (38).  Both 
Crusoe’s and Roxana’s conversions result (at least in their minds) in a permanent 
alteration of interior identity.  From the moment the young Roxana gives into the 
Landlord, she views her interior identity as essentially corrupted, incapable of 
68 
 
being pure again.  Her conversion, however, must not be viewed in exactly the 
same light as Crusoe’s.  Crusoe’s conversion, as I described in the previous 
chapter, is formed in language and is primarily an autobiographical experience.  
Crusoe believes he is able to rewrite his essential nature through willed desire and 
prayer.  Roxana’s conversion from Christian to sinner, on the other hand, is forced 
upon her not only by Amy, but by circumstance itself.  In the face of poverty, she 
reacts almost passively, witnessing the breakdown of her conscience:  “I receiv’d 
his [the Landlord’s] Kindness at the dear Expence of Body and Soul, mortgaging 
Faith, Religion, Conscience, and Modesty, for…a Morsel of Bread…Poverty was 
my snare” (38-39).     
Because Crusoe’s conversion is formed in language and rendered 
autobiographically, it allows him to gain faith in language itself and its capacity to 
represent truth.  At the same token, since Roxana’s identity is altered not through 
language, but through external circumstance, she starts to recognize the extent to 
which language is somehow asymmetrical with truth; that her former signifiers 
which testified to the strength of her moral conscience, reciting “I’d die before I 
consent,” (29) had no real substance and could not guarantee any truth about her 
character.  Just as the stable order to her identity disintegrates, so too does the 
authority of the language system.  For example, when the Landlord vows to save 
her from poverty and tells her that they shall live exactly as husband and wife, 
even though both were married to absent spouses, Roxana cannot bring herself to 
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trust his words without question.  When he promises to love and support her all of 
his life, she asks him, “Must I depend upon your Promise?” (43).  Unlike Crusoe, 
Roxana places little faith in verbal promises, knowing full well that her own 
promise to herself had so easily come undone.  Even when the Landlord “shew’d 
me a Contract in Writing, wherin he engag’d himself to me; to cohabit constantly 
with me; to provide for me in all Respects as a Wife” (42) she is not convinced 
that any contract can actually make her his wife, and instead cannot conceive of 
herself as anything but his whore.  The purpose of the contract is to allow her and 
the Landlord the freedom to view themselves as a legitimate married couple, but 
she refuses to accept even the outward label as the Landlord’s “wife,” believing it 
does not match up with her true identity as his whore:  “We were to call one 
another Man and Wife, who, in the Sence of the Laws, both of God and our 
Country, were no more than two adulterers, in short, a Whore and a Rogue” (43). 
Roxana, however, has no problem masquerading as the Landlord’s wife, as long 
as she knows internally that it is a falsehood.  After her conversion to sin, Roxana 
becomes sharply aware of the performative role of language in such contracts and 
labels, knowing full well that the signifiers serve to perpetuate the performance. 
To this end, Roxana differs significantly with Crusoe, who views contracts and 
self-labels, especially those in writing, as an authorized guarantor of truth.   
Forcefully brought into the world of language and artifice, Roxana is now 
at liberty  to explore her status as an author, knowing full well that while she 
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cannot control her inner being, she can reimagine and re-write her outer identity 
as many times as she likes.  David Durant writes, for example, that “instead of 
suffering financial loss, Roxana pretends loss; instead of being seduced she 
seduces…Roxana moves from the story of a fall from innocence to a complex tale 
of a woman inventing that story in her life.  Roxana’s experience becomes 
increasingly fictive” (Durant 526).  What is significant about Roxana is that, 
while she creates these fictions to move ahead in life, she consistently remains 
conscious of her status as an author, or more specifically, as a master of artifice.  
Though she deceives others, she never attempts to deceive herself.  For example, 
after the death of the Landlord, she “had now no Poverty attending me; on the 
contrary, I was Mistress of ten Thousand Pounds before the Prince did anything to 
me” (Defoe 65)—but she tells the Prince, her new prospective lover, “with some 
Tears, which, I confess, were a little forc’d, That I believ’d if Mr. — had liv’d, we 
shou’d have been out of Danger of Want; but that it was impossible to Estimate 
the Loss which I had sustain’d” (59).  Roxana therefore confesses the overall 
theatricality of her life at large:  “the dirty History of my Actings upon the Stage 
of Life” (75).  When she assumes the identity of the Turkish Princess at the king’s 
ball, she comments extensively on the gown, describing the costume in the most 
intricate detail:   
I return’d dress’d in the Habit of a Turkish Princess; the 
Habit I got at Leghorn, when my Foreign Prince bought be a 
Turkish Slave…the Malthese Man of War had…taken a 
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Turkish Vessel going from Constantinople to Alexandria, in 
which some Ladies bound for Grand Cairo in Egypt; and as 
the Ladies were made Slaves, so their fine Cloths were thus 
expos’d; and with this Turkish Slave, I bought the rich 
Cloths too: The Dress was extraordinarily fine…the Ground 
white, and the Flowers blue and gold, and the Train held five 
Yards; the Dress under it, was a Vest of the same, 
embroider’d with Gold, and set with some Pearl in the 
Work…to the Vest, was a Girdle…set with Diamonds for 
eight Inches either way, only they were not true Diamonds; 
but nobody knew that but myself (174).   
 
This passage is an important one, as it testifies not only to the degree of Roxana’s 
interest in exterior trappings, but more importantly, it suggests that the dress itself 
could be representative of Roxana—who prides herself in being extremely 
beautiful or “extraordinarily fine.”  The dress, layered in flowers, gold 
embroidery, and diamonds (which, she is careful to note, are “not true diamonds”) 
signifies Roxana’s knowledge of her own artificiality. It also highlights the 
intricate work and detail that goes into the fashioning of her exterior personas.  
The textile operates like the text of Roxana’s fictive identity.  Everett Zimmerman 
makes an astute observation about this passage, noting that it represents 
“Roxana’s interests in geographical movement” (Zimmerman 231).  Roxana is 
careful to narrate the many geographic spaces that both she and the garment have 
traversed, thus characterizing her interest in mobility.  I would take this claim a 
step farther, and suggest that the dress signifies not only her interest in 
geographical movement, but Roxana’s own mobility, which for her is both an 
external and internal experience.  If the dress is a symbol of Roxana herself, it 
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would make sense that Defoe would employ such intricate detail to describe not 
only how it looks, but how it was formed across various geographical spaces, not 
unlike Roxana herself.  Here, Defoe makes an important connection between the 
external, geographic terrain that Roxana covers in her travels and the internal 
terrain of Roxana’s character, which itself is as fragmented and various as a map 
of Europe.  Selfhood in this passage is by no means depicted as a monolithic 
structure, but rather as a series of layers that are influenced by various external 
circumstances, such as geographic travel.  The complexity of Roxana’s character 
comes into focus here.  Her identity is less a “thing” than a space upon which 
various “selves” are impressed, and Roxana displays some awareness that this 
space operates largely like a theater that features a number of different 
performances.  Appositely, it is in this scene that Roxana gains the name, 
“Roxana,” which, she explains later, is not her true name:  “the Gentlemen cry’d 
out, Roxana! Roxana! By —, with an oath; upon which foolish Accident I had the 
name Roxana presently fix’d upon me all over the Court End of Town, as 
effectually as if I had been Christen’d Roxana” (176). Her actual Christian name, 
we learn later, is Susan, though it is not “Susan” which serves as the title of her 
autobiography.  By entitling the novel with one of Roxana’s pseudonyms, Defoe 
underscores the fact that the character dissolves entirely into her performances so 
that no truth of her identity can be associated with her.  Even by literary critics, 
Roxana is forever to be known as one who’s performative self prevails over her 
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“real” self; that is, if there is a real self to be spoken of in the first place, a 
question that increases in importance for Roxana. 
 
The “Real” Roxana 
 There are two pivotal moments in the novel, in which Roxana begins to 
question the truth of her own subjectivity—the “real” self within. The first is her 
experience with “storm repentance,” (128) and the second is when she questions, 
after being completely financially secure, “Why am I a Whore now?” (202). 
These episodes of self-exploration are not so dissimilar from Crusoe’s self-inquiry 
in which he asks, “What am I?” (Defoe, Robinson Crusoe, 174).  But while 
Crusoe leads himself toward his Bible, and finds the answer to his identity there, 
Roxana finds herself unable to answer these self-directed inquiries.  The first 
episode occurs when she asks herself, “What must I be?  What must be my 
Portion?” (Defoe, Roxana, 126).  In this scene, both she and Amy believe they 
face imminent death while on an ocean voyage that is caught in a turbulent storm.  
Fearing eternal damnation, Roxana “cry’d out, tho’ softly, two or three times, 
Lord have Mercy upon me; to this I added abundance of Resolutions, of what a 
Life I wou’d live, if it should please God but to spare my Life but this one time; 
how I would live a single and a virtuous Life…doing Good” (126).  Of course, 
after the storm subsided, “the Fears of Death vanish’d…and our Fear of what was 
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beyond Death also; our Sence of the Life we had liv’d went off, and…our wicked 
Taste of Life return’d, and we were both the same as before” (128).   
Many critics, such as Richetti, liken Roxana’s storm repentance to 
Crusoe’s, as he experiences a similar event of getting caught in a sea storm and 
promising to become a Prodigal son if God were to save him (Defoe, Robinson 
Crusoe, 9). The religious context of Roxana’s storm repentance is worth noting, 
though, and it sets her apart from Crusoe’s experience, because Crusoe vows to 
become a Prodigal son, while Roxana prays for religious transformation.  For my 
purposes, it is more beneficial to compare Crusoe’s conversion scene with 
Roxana’s storm repentance, which figures as a desperate prayer for conversion.  
Her hope takes her so far that she at one point prays that “if ever it shou’d please 
God to spare me this one time from Death, it wou’d not be possible that I should 
be the same Creature again” (127).  The passage resembles Crusoe’s conversion 
scene, in which he similarly asks God to change his essential nature and turn 
himself away from his previous life of sin and disbelief:  “… I cried out to 
Jesus…thou exalted prince and savior, give me repentance!” (Defoe, Robinson 
Crusoe, 78).  While Crusoe and Roxana’s storm repentance scenes share some 
distinct parallels, mainly in their mutual failure to transform after the storm, their 
conversion scenes differ significantly.  Here, Crusoe is successful while Roxana 
fails.  From a Puritan standpoint, some might argue that Crusoe is granted 
conversion through God’s grace, while grace is not extended to Roxana because 
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she is damned after her initial fall from innocence.  From a non-Puritan 
perspective, however, it becomes clear that Crusoe’s conversion occurs because 
he desires it, and more importantly, because he believes he has the power to re-
write his essential identity as a man-of-faith.  To this end, Crusoe’s conversion is 
an autobiographical experience.   
Roxana’s character differs from Crusoe’s, because despite her prayers, she 
does not actually have such faith in language, or in God, so it makes sense that her 
prayer would not be granted to her, as it is to Crusoe.  Were Roxana actually to 
embrace Christianity after she arrived safely on land, that would require her to 
believe that she actually has authorial control over her interior identity; and that 
the language of prayer and autobiography weld enough power to alter her 
essential character—two possibilities she will not entertain, since she, unlike 
Crusoe, recognizes the limits of language.  She cannot even articulate her prayer 
out loud, but instead expresses herself only inwardly, unlike Amy who “spoke 
aloud, and cry’d, and call’d aloud, like one in Agony” (126).  Roxana cries only 
“within myself, and sigh’d, and mourn’d inwardly” (126).  Roxana’s interior 
prayer also distinguishes her from Crusoe, whose prayer is voiced out loud when 
he begs God to convert him.  Roxana’s silence is possibly Defoe’s attempt to 
underscore the vacancy within Roxana’s identity.  Defoe implies here that, where 
Roxana looks for truth, comfort, and answers, she finds only an essential “lack” 
that cannot be filled, nor can it even be expressed. After arriving safely on land 
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after the storm, Roxana is extremely contemplative about the experience:  “I 
know not what ail’d me, not I…I was in a kind of Stupidity, I know not well what 
to call it; I had a Mind full of Horrour at the time of the Storm, and saw Death 
before me, as plainly as Amy, but my Thoughts got no Vent, as Amy’s did; I had 
a silent sullen kind of Grief, which cou’d not break out either in Words or Tears, 
and which was, therefore, much the worse to bear” (129).  Julie Crane comments 
on this passage, suggesting that as Roxana’s “developing inwardness…grows [it] 
becomes incommunicable.  The novel is littered with voices and stories, all 
complete and understandable; only Roxana’s cannot be told” (Crane 20). The 
incommunicability of Roxana’s voice is worth noting, and has significant 
implications regarding her identity.  This passage displays the first moment in 
which Roxana shows some suspicion that there is no interior self underlying her 
physical body; and the “horror” and “grief” she feels is the effect of this 
suspicion, as she recognizes that her interior character may not be as stable or 
knowable as she might hope—nor can she even verify its existence.  This is what 
Maddox call’s Roxana’s “appalling missing center” (Maddox 674).  Her silence is 
a sign of her essential voicelessness. Genuinely, she wants to believe that she is 
repentant, because if she were, she could start to view herself as a Christian, and 
take comfort in such an identity, as Crusoe does.  Roxana admits that her desire to 
become a penitent Christian was merely opportunistic, and recognizes that she 
cannot actually rewrite her “self” as a penitent:  “I had no thorow effectual 
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Repentance; no Sight of my Sins in their proper Shape; no View of a Redeemer or 
Hope in him:  I had only such a Repentance as a Criminal has at the Place of 
Execution, who is sorry, not that he has committed the crime, as it is a Crime, but 
sorry that he has to be Hang’d for it” (Defoe 129).  Roxana’s inability to repent 
derives from her intense self-awareness.  She knows any repentance would merely 
be another performance for the sake of survival (or spiritual survival in this case).  
But Roxana eventually recognizes her Christian prayers as simply another one of 
her fictions, as she has no power to actually transform her interior self; even more 
terrifying, she displays some uncertainty that there is an interior self at all.    
  In the second episode in which Roxana explores her interiority, she is 
older and having had many lovers and acquired more wealth than she could ever 
need, she asks herself,  
Why am I a Whore now?  I could not…answer that I lov’d it 
for the sake for the Vice, and that I delighted in being a 
Whore…I cou’d not say this, even to myelf, and all alone, 
nor indeed, wou’d it have been true…Necessity first 
debauch’d me, and Poverty made me a Whore at the 
beginning…But this was all over now; Avarice cou’d have 
no Pretence…now I was so far from Poor (202).    
 
This is one of the few passages in which Roxana explores her true subjectivity, 
what she believes is essential to her character.  Her former question, “What must I 
be?  What must be my Portion?” (126) is echoed again here. She recognizes that 
her motivations for initially converting to a life of vice were for the sake of 
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survival, and now that this is a non-issue, she questions what motivates her to 
continue a life of sin.  If Roxana bore more resemblances with Crusoe, she might 
have experienced a real conversion at this point, and may have felt authentic 
repentance over her past.  Instead, she resents her status as a whore only because 
she “cou’d not make myself known to my own Children, or form any 
Acquaintances in the World” (208).  In other words, her desire to stop whoring is, 
once again, an opportunistic one.  But because she believes her conversion to a 
life of sin permanently corrupted her character, she is also convinced that “the 
thing cannot be remedy’d now, but the Scandal of it…may be thrown off” (208).  
In other words, while she does not have the power to change her interior 
character, she can alter her outward appearance.  Durant comments on this point:  
“She continues to think of herself as a person whose real self is disguised by her 
long life as a whore, but when she stops whoring, she finds there is no hidden self 
to reveal.  Instead there is simply a new disguise:  she replaces the Turkish dress 
with a Quaker one” (Durant 231).  Durant suggests that Roxana has dissolved 
entirely into her performances, so there is no “self” underlying her being at all.  
Roxana also starts becoming suspicious of this possibility, especially when her 
authorial designs begin to fall apart.    
 In the final quarter of the novel, Defoe begins seriously to threaten the 
stability of everything Roxana was formerly certain of:  first, that her talents as an 
author and master of artifice have no limitations; and second, that even if the 
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interior identity to the self is a detestable one, it exists nonetheless.  Disrupting 
both of these assumptions, Defoe subverts any possibility of self-mastery for 
Roxana. When Amy first tells Roxana that she can become a Quaker by putting 
“off all your Equipages, and Servants, Coaches, and Horses; change your 
Liveries, nay your own Clothes, and if it was possible, your very face
19
” (Defoe 
208), Roxana is thoroughly convinced that she is skilled enough in the art of 
artifice to pull off such a scheme.  Just as Crusoe is confident in his authority as a 
creator of truths, so too is Roxana in her abilities as an author to create fictions:  
“There was not a Quaker in Town look’d less like a Counterfeit than I did:  But 
all this was my particular Plot to be the more compleatly conceal’d and that I 
might depend upon being not known, and yet need not be confin’d like a Prisoner, 
and be always in Fear; so that all the rest was Grimace” (213).  Roxana expresses 
the utmost confidence in her ability to have it all—she believes she can pose as a 
Quaker without sacrificing a public life.  Authorship, by this advanced point in 
her “career,” is a simple enough task for Roxana.  While she realizes she cannot 
completely erase “Roxana’s” identity, she can at least write over it without fear of 
exposure.  This confidence, however, is threatened twice:  first by the appearance 
of her former lover, the Dutch Merchant; and second, by a young girl named 
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 Note, it is often Amy who pulls the strings behind Roxana’s character.  Amy has often been 
read as Roxana’s “alter ego,” but there is some indication that she is actually the “author” within 
Roxana; the part of Roxana’s self that helps her execute her fictions.  Terry Castle identifies Amy 
as “the secret sharer in Roxana’s life:  she acts out her mistress’s fantasies, she accepts the 
functions Roxana projects, both consciously and unconsciously, onto her” (Castle 84).   
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Susan who claims to be her daughter.  When she sees the Dutch Merchant in 
town, she tells her Quaker friend, “I am sure he don’t know me in this Dress, and 
I’ll take Care he shan’t see my Face, if I can help it; so I held up my Fan before 
my Face” (218). Later, when Roxana believes the Dutch Merchant is on the verge 
of discovering her, she “colour’d again as red as Fire” and “suffer’d a hundred 
Thousand Perplexities of Mind…my thoughts were all confus’d, and in the utmost 
Disorder” (220-222).  Roxana experiences for the first time the anxieties of 
authorship.  Aware that her performative identity operates like a text, she now 
begins to doubt her ability to be as convincing an author/performer as she has 
always been.  Later, after the appearance of Susan, Roxana’s anxiety intensifies as 
she finds it increasingly difficult to manage the multiple identities she has 
authored over time.  While masquerading as a Quaker on board a ship with her 
new husband, she suddenly learns, to her dismay, that her daughter Susan who 
knows about her past life as Roxana, is also aboard the ship:   
If the Girl knew me, I was undone…I was to conceal myself, 
if possible, and yet had not the least room to do anything 
towards it:  in short, there was no retreat; no shifting 
anything off; no avoiding or preventing her [Susan] having a 
full Sight of me; nor was there any counterfeiting my Voice, 
for then my Husband wou’d have perceiv’d it; in short there 
was not the least circumstance that offer’d me  any 
Assistance, or any favourable thing to help me in the 
Exigence (276-278). 
 
Authorship is no longer as simple or as easily executed a task for Roxana, as her 
multiple identities have now begun to surface at once.  She cannot disguise herself 
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from Susan without exposing herself to her husband.  So, unable to 
“shift…anything off,” she recognizes that her status as an author of fictions has 
become severely disrupted, and her former plan to “not be confin’d like a 
Prisoner, and be always in fear” has fallen apart.  Imprisonment is tantamount to a 
lack of control, so for her to be imprisoned and limited by her own performed 
identities is the worst possible scenario for Roxana, who toward the end of the 
novel, grasps desperately for control over how she is perceived.  According to 
John Mullen, her struggles as an author are visible even in the narration of the 
story itself:  “the loose punctuation and accretive syntax (new clauses, new 
thoughts, constantly added on to the end of sentences) are signs of a writer in a 
hurry, they are also vividly suited to the struggles of ‘The Unfortunate Mistress,’ 
for these are not just her struggles to survive, but her struggles to make her life 
into a narrative” (Mullen xxv).   
 By the end of the novel, Roxana’s struggles with identity reveal 
themselves as not only narratological, but ontological.  Defoe presents Susan not 
only as a character threatening the exposure of Roxana’s past self, but 
destabilizing Roxana’s very being.  Allegorically, Susan’s function is extremely 
complex, and must not be read on solely a literal level.  She represents the idea of 
a true, interior identity within the self.  Sharing Roxana’s original, Christian 
name, she operates as “the very Counterpart of myself [Roxana]” (Defoe 329). 
Susan therefore allegorically represents the possibility that the truth or center of 
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the interior self can be known; hence, her sole desire is for her mother to “claim” 
ownership of her:  “O! says she, She is my Mother; She is my Mother; and she 
does not own me…I believe she does not know me, but I know her; and I know 
that she is my mother” (305).  Susan’s certainty alludes to the possibility of an 
intrinsic connection between Roxana and her “true” self, allegorized through 
Susan.  Roxana, on some level, believes that Susan is actually her daughter, as she 
feels sincere tenderness for the girl:  “No Pen can describe, no Words can 
express…the strange Impression which this thing made upon my Spirits; I felt 
something shoot thro’ my Blood; my Heart flutter’d…much ado I had, not to 
abandon myself to an Excess of Passion at the first Sight of her, much more when 
my Lips touch’d her Face” (277).  Both pleasurable and painful, this moment is 
one of Lacanian jouissance for Roxana, who feels an intrinsic, even bodily 
connection with Susan, who is in fact the product of her own body.  Allegorically, 
this tenderness is not love for Susan, but love for herself—an attachment to the 
idea that the truth of the self, the interior identity, must exist, and that it is 
authentically real and outside of language, as “no Pen can describe” and “no 
Words can express” it.  Susan, for Roxana, represents the possibility of reuniting 
with the interior self, which she has kept hidden and buried for so many years.     
Roxana therefore finds herself in a double-bind, manifesting in the “love-
hate” relationship she has with Susan—which allegorically represents the love-
hate relationship she has with her own interior identity.  On the one hand, she 
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wants to claim Susan as her daughter, given the love and tenderness she inwardly 
expresses toward her.  Her love for Susan is a testament to her own self-love.  The 
idea of a stable, interior identity is comforting to Roxana (just as it is for Crusoe) 
because it provides the illusion of stability, at least on some level, to her turbulent 
life—even if that identity is one she detests.  It is thus understandable that Roxana 
does not want Amy to murder Susan; she wants to continue to believe that the 
truth of the self necessarily exists, and more significantly, that it can be known or 
claimed. But on the other hand, she does not want to outwardly claim Susan as 
her own, because to do so would risk exposure of the “truth” of her identity, 
which she hates and intends to keep secret.  So instead of killing Susan, she 
simply wants Susan out of her sight.  To Roxana, the truth of identity cannot exist 
in the light; it must be buried and hidden away:  “the Notion of being discover’d 
carried with is so many frightful Ideas, and hurry’d my Thoughts so much, that I 
was scarce myself…” (Defoe 274, my emphasis). The doubt and anxiety 
surrounding Susan is none other than the doubt and anxiety surrounding the self, 
which is proving to be a construct that Roxana understands less and less.   
When Susan actually does disappear, along with Amy, Roxana is 
convinced that Amy has murdered the girl, and has a strong emotional response 
that leads her into a sustained silence:  “I was struck as with a Blast from 
Heaven…like a Mad-Woman; I had nobody to speak a Word to, to give Vent to 
my Passion, nor did I speak a Word for a good-while, till after it had almost 
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overcome me” (Defoe 323).  Again, Roxana’s silence appositely describes her 
character, which finally, has no verifiable voice from which to speak. The silence 
is thus rendered both outwardly and inwardly.  The final pages of the novel are 
characterized by Roxana’s silence, possibly indicating that Roxana can have no 
certainty over her identity or even her desires.  For example, while she clearly 
laments the death of Susan, she still seems somewhat relieved by it:  “she [Susan] 
brought me even to the Brink of Destruction, and wou’d, in all Probability, have 
trac’d me out at last, if Amy had not by the Violence of her Passion…put a Stop 
to her; of which I cannot enter into the Particulars here” (328).  It is uncertain as 
to what “Particulars” Roxana refers to—whether it is the particulars of the facts of 
what occurred or those of her actual feelings on the matter.  Neither, at this point, 
is knowable—either by Roxana or her readers.  Susan’s death itself is uncertain, 
as Roxana never verifies whether Amy actually murdered the girl or if she 
managed to silence her in some other fashion.  Either way, Susan has virtually 
been erased from Roxana’s life. If Susan represents the possibility of knowing the 
self, her disappearance tragically destroys any such possibility for Roxana. 
 This unknowability of the self is allegorically represented through the fact 
that Roxana never provides any sense of finality to the end of her autobiography.  
Instead, she only drops hints of a future disaster, which she never actually 
narrates:  “Here after some few years of flourishing…I fell into a dreadful Course 
of Calamities” (329).  She does not specify what these “calamities” are, and 
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frequently, though unapologetically, explains her inability to finish narrating her 
story, using phrases such as, “I have not Time here to take Notice…”, “Tis 
enough to mention here…” and “I can say no more now…”  (329). Durant 
comments on this lack of closure, arguing that “what makes the novel seem 
unfinished is that Roxana finally does not believe in her own reality either as 
success or as sinner. The joint perspective she has fostered throughout her life 
ultimately cancel each other out, leaving her no way of believing her life 
complete” (Durant 232).  In the end, Roxana is neither a success, nor a failure; 
neither a sinner nor a repentant. She does not know her own motives, doubting 
even the authenticity of her repentance.  It is difficult to comment on what 
Roxana has learned by the end of her experience, because her narration itself 
reveals very little of her interior thoughts.  Julie Crane argues that “it is as though 
Defoe gives up on his heroine…he is defeated, as Roxana herself is defeated by 
the complex web he has created” (Crane 14).  I would argue that Roxana’s silence 
is a willed effort on Defoe’s part to underscore that the self is no stable or 
knowable construct, whether it is formed by language, circumstance, or any other 
condition. Roxana’s silence and the inconclusiveness of her narration may 
therefore indicate that she has caught on to the knowledge that Defoe has pressed 
upon her:  that while the public self is controllable, authors must inevitably face 
the difficulties of their craft; and that the private self is not only outside an 




Exploring the Wreck: Coetzee’s Foe    
Introduction 
I came to explore the wreck… 
the thing I came for: 
the wreck and not the story of the wreck 
the thing itself and not the myth 
 
    -Adrienne Rich, “Diving into the Wreck” 
 
 
 J.M. Coetzee’s Foe incorporates the plot of both Robinson Crusoe and 
Roxana, as it features Susan (Roxana’s Christian name as well as her daughter’s 
name) who is cast upon Cruso’s
20
 island.  But as I have mentioned in the 
introductory chapter, Foe also integrates the plot of Adrienne Rich’s poem, 
“Diving into the Wreck,” which is a good starting point to begin thinking about 
the novel.  Manuel Jimenez writes that the poem “has been sometimes read 
alongside Coetzee’s novel” (Jimenez 20) given the thematic parallels regarding 
Rich’s and Coetzee’s investigation of “the real and its representation” (21).  There 
is evidence, though, that the parallels between the poem and novel are more than 
just thematic, and that their intertextuality is not just coincidental.  Significantly, 
the “wreck” is a recurring symbol across Robinson Crusoe, Roxana, and Foe.  
Robinson Crusoe dives out to the shipwreck and rescues tools, provisions, and his 
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 Recall that Coetzee drops the “e” in Crusoe’s name.  
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Bible.  Roxana, as Zimmerman notes
21
, frequently uses nautical imagery to 
describe her emotions, stating at one point that, “I call’d myself a thousand Fools, 
for casting myself upon a Life of Scandal and Hazard, when after the Shipwreck 
of Virtue, Honor, and Principle…I had safe Harbour presented, and no Heart to 
cast-Anchor in it” (Defoe, Roxana 162, my emphasis).  Coetzee perhaps has taken 
notice of the recurring symbol in Defoe, but dramatizes its value in Foe by 
combining it thematically with Rich’s poem.   Cast away on the island with Cruso 
and the silent Friday, Susan Barton asks:  “If we could dive to the wreck…we 
might save from it tools of greatest utility…Is there no way to explore the 
wreck?” (32). These lines may be taken literally, as an actual exploration of 
Cruso’s old ship, but there is evidence that the wreck represents something more 
for Susan.  Toward the end of the novel, Foe tells her, “We must make Friday’s 
silence speak,” (142) so that they can finally learn the truth behind his mutilation.  
Susan responds, “But who will do it? …It is easy enough to…say what must be 
done, but who will dive into the wreck?” (142).   
For Rich and for Coetzee, the wreck represents the same thing:  the truth, 
the origin, the thing itself that exists beyond the discursive limits of signification, 
“the wreck and not the story of the wreck.”  “Diving into the wreck” is 
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 Zimmerman argues that the “constantly lurking [nautical] allusions gain force through 
repetition” and “hint at Roxana’s spiritual terrors.  For example, such a simple word as the 
frequently recurring bottom acquires a powerful set of associations by the end of the novel:  it 
refers to (1) ships, (2) a hiding place, and (3) the sea floor” (Zimmerman 230).  Significantly, it is 
at the “bottom” of the sea floor that the wreck is located.    
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tantamount to searching for the truth outside all forms of representation.  While 
many critics, Derek Attridge and Laura Wright most notably, explore the 
sociopolitical, feminist, and post-colonial themes in Foe, I would argue that, 
alongside these issues, Coetzee’s novel parallels Defoe in that it, too, confronts 
the question of whether language is capable of answering anything substantial 
about truth.  In questioning the authority of language, however, Coetzee extends 
Defoe’s narrative purpose by simultaneously exploring the destabilizing effects of 
authorship.  Foe therefore investigates how authors must negotiate between truth 
and representation.   
Upon a close examination of Susan’s character, it becomes evident that 
Coetzee has culled characteristics from both Defoe’s Crusoe and Roxana to create 
Susan Barton. Conflating Defoe’s protagonists, Susan continues the intellectual 
trajectory of the mono-character.  She starts out exhibiting a number of 
similarities to Crusoe, such as his faith in language and the idea of a stable 
identity, but she matures intellectually and eventually embodies Roxana’s intense 
self-awareness.  By the end of the novel, however, she exceeds the awareness of 
both Crusoe and Roxana. 
In the beginning of the novel when Susan documents her life on the island 
in letters to the author, Foe, she employs both the epistolary and autobiographical 
forms in an attempt to display narrative control over the truth of her identity.  It is 
to this extent that she resembles Crusoe.  Notably, Susan makes the same three 
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assumptions as Defoe’s Crusoe that lead her toward believing in the possibility of 
self-mastery:  that there is a stable sense of selfhood or metaphysical identity 
beyond the exterior of the body; that it is knowable; and that it can be adequately 
represented in language.  Also like Crusoe, Susan believes she has the authority to 
control and “discover” this identity through her language as an author.  Susan is 
not only interested in discovering the truth of her own identity, though; much of 
the novel focuses on Susan’s near obsession with discovering Friday’s as well and 
her frustration with her inability to read him.  Friday, a character operating 
outside language, resists interpretation, and his identity remains an open signifier.  
While Susan’s narrative demonstrates the problems inherent in authorship, her 
relationship with Friday shows the destabilizing effects of readership and 
interpretation, which contributes to her intellectual development and her 
understanding of identity.  During the process of her own identity-construction as 
well as her “search” for Friday, Susan begins to embody Roxana’s level of 
awareness, but surpasses her as she begins to seriously doubt whether a stable, 
authentic edifice actually lies beyond the signifier of identity, a realization that 
comes in the form of a dramatic and disturbing climax.  The novel ultimately 
questions whether the truth of one’s identity can be discovered or whether identity 
is instead a function of linguistic imaging.     
The aim of this chapter is to explore the ways in which Susan Barton, as 
the final stage in the mono-character’s development, attempts to dive into the 
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wreck in order to answer the question of her own identity and of Friday’s.  I will 
examine how, as author or “father to her story,” (Coetzee 123) Susan’s frustration 
issues from a destabilizing realization that neither Crusoe nor Roxana fully 
achieve: that an authentic identity is not only beyond discursive reach, but 
potentially, completely unknowable for both the self and the other—even to those 
granted the (ostensible) authority of authorship.    
 
Susan’s Dive 
  Coetzee clues us in early on that Susan’s utter faith in the utility of 
language is also somewhat misguided.  Like Defoe’s Crusoe, she similarly 
conceives of words as epistemological tools for accessing truth.  For example, she 
believes that if Friday had a tongue, he could explain the truth of how he was 
mutilated; but on the other hand, she cannot seem to get the truth out of Cruso
22
, 
who can speak, but whose stories “were so various, and so hard to reconcile one 
with another, that the more I was driven to conclude that…he no longer knew for 
sure what was truth, what fancy,” so that “in the end I did not know what was 
truth, what was lies, and what was mere rambling” (12).  Despite this clear 
evidence of the instability of speech, Susan still desires it more than anything else 
on the “island where no one spoke” (35).  Cruso tells her, “we have no need of a 
great stock of words” (21).  In other words, Friday and Cruso have no real desire 
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 Coetzee’s Crusoe differs significantly from Defoe’s.  In Foe, Cruso is a simple, taciturn, and 
relatively unambitious character who loves the island and has no desire to be rescued. 
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for speech.  Here, Cruso makes an important connection between desire and 
language, a connection formerly explored by Lacan.  For Lacan, language is 
always already a function of desire:  desire to communicate, to be understood, to 
learn the truth.  And because desire emerges only where there is lack, all speaking 
subjects are marked by lack (Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts, 168).  
Cruso remarks later on that “as long as our desires are moderate we have no need 
of laws” (36).  The same, however, can be said of speech.  Susan’s desires, unlike 
Crusoe and Friday’s, are not moderate, not because she is selfish or hedonistic, 
but because she is human
23
, while Cruso and Friday are only partially 
recognizable as human given their persistent silence and limited needs.  Susan is 
in a constant state of lack and utter discontent no matter where she is:  “When I 
was on the island I longed only to be elsewhere…But now a longing stirs in me I 
never thought I would feel” (50).   
Susan’s discontent and persistent longing evince her lack of a stable sense 
of selfhood.  Like Defoe’s Crusoe, she passes through a number of roles: she was 
originally Susan Berton, and then Susan Barton, and then Mrs. Cruso.  She was 
formerly a member of the upper class, but now works as a servant.  A vagrant 
both abroad and at home, she starts out traveling the seas in search of her 
                                                          
23
 Though I explore Susan’s desire for language and identity as representative of a “human” 
condition, critics such as Laura Wright have argued that Susan’s discontent is rather a feminist 
issue (Wright 22).  Wright does not explore language and identity specifically, but an argument 
can be made that Susan’s desire for signifying power is symptomatic of a feminine lack, namely, 
the lack of phallus.            
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daughter, and after returning to London, moves from home to home, none of 
which belong to her.  Her frequent mobility is also analogous with the itinerant 
Roxana, except that while Roxana travels to acquire wealth and status, Susan’s 
finances and social status deteriorate with every move, possibly allegorizing the 
slow disintegration of her sense of identity.  With no stable ground beneath her, 
Susan remains plagued by the need to fill the space, the lack, within herself with 
meaning
24
.  Just as Defoe’s Crusoe combats his paranoid fear of erasure, Susan 
attempts to fill the space of her lack by engaging in various acts of speech and 
writing, which reveals a latent desire to establish a holistic sense of selfhood: she 
changes her name, solicits Foe to write her life-story, and writes letters about her 
life.  The novel investigates and complicates Susan’s desire for signification and 
selfhood in a number of ways, though I will focus here on two:  first, through 
Susan’s dependence on Foe to write her story; and second, how Susan—after 
getting no response from Foe, is forced to continue to author her story in her own 
words in letters to Foe, thereby engaging in a form of autobiography.    
Because Foe is a real author, Susan trusts his authority to construct her 
identity, based on what she tells him about herself.  Coetzee demonstrates here 
that one way of attempting to establish or confirm identity is through the 
language, or acknowledgement, of others.  In other words, Susan needs Foe’s 
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 This desire is summed up nicely by one of Coetzee’s other characters from his novel, Disgrace:  
David Lurie remarks that the purpose of language originates from “the need to fill out with sound 
the overlarge and rather empty human soul” (Coetzee, Disgrace, 4).  
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language to confirm her identity.   Arguably, like Defoe’s Crusoe, Susan does not 
know who she is: “When I reflect on my story I seem to exist only as the one who 
came, the one who witnessed, the one who longed to be gone:  a being without 
substance, a ghost” (Coetzee 51).  She therefore clings to the hope that her 
selfhood can be restored to her through Foe’s language:  “Return to me the 
substance I have lost, Mr. Foe:  that is my entreaty.  For though my story gives the 
truth, it does not give the substance of the truth” (51).  She hopes that Foe’s words 
will fill the space of her lack, to provide substance to her identity, unaware that 
words themselves are not substantive.  Blindly, she wants to believe that signifiers 
actually have the authority they claim to, and that authors, who create the 
signifiers, also have this authority.   
Foe, however, only functions as the absent “other” to Susan’s story for the 
better part of the novel, because no matter how often she writes to him, she only 
finds silence in return.  She explains “what it is to speak into a void, day after day, 
without answer” (Coetzee 80).  Lacan discusses this void of silence between the 
speaker and other
25
:  “If the first thing to make itself heard is the void, it is within 
himself [the patient] that he will experience it, and it is beyond the Word that he 
will seek a reality to fill this void” (Lacan, “Language of the Self,” 9).  In other 
words, the silent void of the other, or the emptiness caused by the lack of 
response, is felt internally within the speaker, and the speaking subject feels the 
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 The speaker and other for Lacan are the patient and psychoanalyst, but the relationship is 
comparable to Susan and Foe.   
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need to fill that emptiness with something real, or beyond language
26
.  Foe’s 
silence makes her increasingly suspicious that she is not a substantive being, and 
further frustrates her desire to become one.  
Susan displays some perseverance, though, because even though she 
eventually gives up on the hope that Foe will ever respond, she continues to write 
letters to him.  It is therefore Susan who ends up writing the story in the first 
person, and thus, in the form of autobiography.  Since she gets no help from Foe, 
she believes she can now attempt to reclaim authority over her story, and 
therefore, exert a degree of control over who she is and how she is represented.  
Given Susan’s autobiographical aspirations, she must rely on the only tool 
available to her to construct this identity, namely, language:  “Author, father, 
God, phallus, full Presence, Truth, Word, Law:  all of these terms are part of 
Susan’s desire to be ‘father to my story’ [Coetzee 123]” (Jimenez 12).  
Initially, her faith in language makes her feel as though narrative control is 
achievable
27
, and she actively assumes the role of author:  “I sat at your bureau 
this morning,” she writes to Foe, “[using] your pen, your ink, I know, but 
somehow the pen becomes mine while I write with it” (Coetzee 66-67).  She even 
writes, “I had not guessed it was so easy to be an author” (93). But as an 
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 At this early point in the novel, Susan trusts in the authority of language to the extent that a 
response from Foe may have actually been enough to fill the void; it is later on in the novel that 
she begins to realize the instability of language and, arguably, searches “beyond the Word” to 
“seek a reality to fill this void” (Lacan 9).   
27
 Not unlike Crusoe and Roxana 
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autobiographer, she “also suffers the same problems as any other author” 
(Jimenez 12).  In other words, she experiences the loss of authority inherent in 
authorship, best described by Roland Barthes:  “Writing is that neutral, composite, 
oblique space where our subject slips away:  the negative where all identity is 
lost, starting with the very identity of the body of writing” (Barthes 1).  Barthes’ 
“Death of the Author” and Michel Foucault’s “What is an Author?” both examine 
the author’s loss of authority, or “death,” in which the author must sacrifice 
control over the meaning or the “identity of the body of writing,” thereby severing 
the connection between author and text forever.  While the author grasps for 
control, the text reveals itself to be something that resists control.  
Neither Barthes nor Foucault examines in the above-mentioned works 
how the process of signification becomes infinitely more destabilizing during the 
act of autobiography, but their claims apply to autobiographical writing as well. 
Mistakenly, Susan assumes that the gap between the authorial self and the textual, 
objective self is non-existent and that the persona presented in the text will 
necessarily reflect her “true” self.   As I mentioned in the introductory chapter, 
what is unique to autobiography is that the author is both the subject who is 
writing and the object that is written; this is the distinction I outlined between the 
“authorial self” or writing subject and “objective self” featured in the text. 
Foucault discusses this paradox; he explains that, in all forms of writing, what 
emerges from the author is a “plurality of self” (Foucault 553). The problems of 
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authorship, or what he calls “the author function,” issue partially from the fact 
that the author “does not refer purely and simply to a real individual, since it can 
give rise simultaneously to several selves, to several subjects—positions that can 
be occupied by different classes of individuals” (553).  The difficulty Susan 
experiences has to do with her attempt to maintain narrative control not only over 
her authorial self but also her objective self.  Coetzee, I believe, depicts this 
textual self-doubling allegorically, through the mysterious arrival of Susan’s 
“daughter” who is also named Susan Barton.   
The arrival of the young Susan is one of the most striking analogies to 
Roxana’s narrative, in which Roxana is destabilized by the sudden emergence of 
her daughter who begs her mother to recognize her and claim her as her own
28
.  In 
Roxana, Susan allegorically represents the possibility of a “true” identity that is 
real, knowable, and that exists beyond language.  Coetzee takes this allegory a 
step further in Foe, in which the young girl, bearing Susan’s name, also arrives 
unexpectedly and presents herself to Susan as her daughter.  The older Susan, 
however, adamantly denies this, and is continuously mystified by the girl.  Susan 
Barton does not realize that the girl is her daughter, but she is not the girl’s 
mother; she is her father—her author.  Susan declares herself “father to [her] 
story” (123), and the young Susan Barton is the story, the “objective self” in 
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 See chapter 3 on Roxana, pages 86-90. 
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Susan’s text.  Susan tells the girl, “You are father-born
29
.  You have no mother.  
The pain you feel is the pain of lack, not the pain of loss” (91).  The girl, father-
born, is thus the textual representation of Susan:  the “objective self” that can only 
be confirmed in language—and like all language, she is marked by the “pain of 
lack.”  This is why, when Susan attempts to figure out the girl’s origin, she is 
unable to do so, because “what you know of your parentage comes to you in the 
form of stories” (91).  Despite Susan’s former faith in language, she starts now to 
develop Roxana’s awareness about language; namely, that its truth-telling 
capacity is unreliable at best, especially when attempting to explain one’s identity.  
In the world of the novel, the girl’s identity could possibly be traced to Susan, but 
since the only knowledge of their connection comes “in the form of stories,” there 
is no way to know the true origin
30
 or identity of the girl.  Further evidence that 
the girl is Susan’s “objective” or textual self, comes in Part IV of the novel; a 
surreal, dreamlike sequence in which Coetzee seems to enter the novel himself 
and finds the dead bodies of all his characters:  Coetzee describes the dead body 
of the young Susan Barton whose “face is wrapped in a grey woolen scarf.  I 
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 This connection between authorship and “the father” has been made by numerous theorists.  
Roland Barthes, for example, writes “The Author is thought to nourish the book, which is to say 
that he exists before it…in the same relation of antecedence to his work as a father to his child” 
(2).  Lacan also positions the father in the Symbolic order of language, which is made up of lack, 
substitution, and linguistic signs.  It is the father’s phallus which charges the signifier with its 
(ostensible) authority.   
30
 Notice, again, how Susan’s narrative parallel’s Defoe’s Roxana. Julie Crane, in her essay on 
Roxana, writes that “[Roxana] is faced with the workings of reality in the inescapable form of her 
daughter who has been growing to womanhood as she has been ageing, and who is ready to ask 
the most basic questions of origin” (Crane 24).  
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begin to unwrap it, but the scarf is endless” (153).  The girl is literally shrouded in 
textile—or text—which surrounds and obscures her face to the extent that no 
amount of unraveling will ever reveal her true identity.  When Susan denies all 
connections to the girl, it becomes clear that no authentic connection can be 
sought between the “authorial self” and the “objective self,” perhaps especially in 
autobiographical writing. While the author believes herself to be substantive, the 
identity written in the text is just a story, and therefore remains “ghost-like,” 
foreign, and unrecognizable. Hence, Susan Barton exclaims, “this child, who calls 
herself by my name, is a ghost, a substantial ghost” (132).  
It is only after coming to this realization, that the young girl’s identity is 
dependent only on language, that Susan suddenly begins to doubt her own identity 
as author:  “who am I?  I presented myself to you in words I knew to be my 
own…When I was writing those letters that were never read by you [Foe]…I 
continued to trust in my own authorship” (133).  In this pivotal moment, Susan 
recognizes the possibility that even her own identity, as the “authorial self,” is 
equally as ghost-like and unstable as the young Susan, the “objective self,” 
because Susan’s identity is also only dependent on language
31
.  This climactic 
realization brings to light the fact that the former trust she had in her own being, 
as an author with narrative control over her identity, may have been merely an 
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 This is not to say that the author’s physical body itself is not real, but that the concept of the 
author’s identity is, like the “objective self,” a linguistic construct.  It is the Platonic ideal of 
identity, the authentic “thing” that exists beyond the signifier that is essentially imaginary.   
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illusion.  Lacan discusses this fear of realizing the fragility of one’s own identity 
when attempting to explain it to someone else (as Susan does in her 
autobiographical letters to Foe): 
He ends up by recognizing that this being has never been 
anything more than his construct in the Imaginary and that 
this construct disappoints all his certitudes…For in this labor 
which he undertakes to reconstruct this construct for another 
[the psychoanalyst] he finds again the [feeling of] 
fundamental alienation…This ego…is frustration in its 
essence (Lacan 11).  
 
Lacan testifies here that the entire concept of identity is in itself an imaginary 
construction or more simply, a story.  It was Susan’s attempt to “reconstruct” 
(recreate in language) her identity that led to this feeling of “fundamental 
alienation” or dislocation from herself.  Coetzee depicts this fundamental 
alienation through the literal splitting of Susan’s identities between herself and the 
young Susan, but what becomes clear is that both identities—the “authorial” and 
“objective” selves—are equally unstable, imaginary manifestations of the mind’s 
desire that exist only in language.   
In a fearsome, almost uncanny manner, Susan’s previous suspicions prove 
to be true, that she too is “a being without substance, a ghost” (51).  Like the girl’s 
identity, her own can also only be confirmed through the unstable medium of 
language: 
But now all my life grows to be story and there is nothing of 
my own left to me.  I thought I was myself…But now I am 
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full of doubt.  Nothing is left to me but doubt.  I am doubt 
itself.  Who is speaking me?  Am I a phantom too?  To what 
order do I belong? (133) 
 
This realization is Coetzee’s manner of dramatizing Roxana’s level of awareness 
at the end of her story.  Roxana’s refusal to narrate the end of her autobiography 
testifies to her suspicion that there may be no “truth” within the self to narrate.  
But in the above passage, Coetzee makes Susan’s dawning realization quite 
explicit:  “Nothing is left to me but doubt.  I am doubt itself.”  Having arrived at 
the realization, however terrifying, that there is no true metaphysical identity 
underlying her body, she experiences a crisis of being, and no longer knows how 
to categorize herself.  She asks, “to what order do I belong?” It may be useful to 
look again to Lacan to examine this question.   
Arguably, Susan belongs to the Symbolic order, the world of 
communication and linguistic signs which is also the order of the Author/Father.  
Like Susan herself, the Symbolic order is “lack” because it is marked by the 
desire for speech and signification.  Despite the fact that Susan comes to the 
striking realization of the instability of authorship, authority, and language, she 
ultimately has difficulty accepting the fact that her own identity is a myth.  She 
remains plagued by the desire to lay claim over what she can call a stable sense of 
selfhood.  It is for this reason that, while she extends the intellectual trajectory of 
the mono-character, she by no means completes it.  Her essential flaw is that, 
initially, she confuses the “story of the wreck” for the wreck itself.  But even 
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when she recognizes the story as a myth, she still clings to the hope that the wreck 
exists and that it is real and knowable, without fully accepting that it, too, is a 
story
32
.  When Susan laments, “I am doubt itself.  Who is speaking me?  Am I a 
phantom too?” she, in an almost Lear-like fashion, seems to be crying: “Who is it 
that can tell me who I am?”  In the end, she is still questioning, “Is there no way 
to explore the wreck?” (32). But the wreck, or the truth of identity, Cruso said is 
“broken by the waves and covered in sand” (32).  In other words, to search for it 
is useless, because ultimately, it is inaccessible—unknowable.   
The wreck is not a place of utility in Foe, as it is in Defoe’s Robinson 
Crusoe, but a place that is essentially tied to myth. While Susan, as an author, 
attempted to retrieve her identity, “the substance I have lost” (51), she does not 
realize that her identity was always already lost upon her. And by attempting to 
create her identity by means of her own authorship, she  ultimately finds that she 
is only capable of creating a myth, as identity reveals itself as merely an idea 
conceived in language, which, according to Lacan, inevitably “disappoints all 
certitudes” (Lacan 11).   
 
Finding Friday 
Just as Susan believes in the truth of her own identity, she also has faith 
that Friday must have a “discoverable” identity, something that “stirred beneath 
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 Note, for example, that Susan never actually sees Cruso’s wreck, but only hears about it from 
him, who as we know, is an unreliable speaker.   
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that dull and unpleasing exterior” (Coetzee 32).  If Susan’s narrative 
problematizes authorship, Friday’s does the same for readership.  Susan’s 
problem with Friday is that she mistakenly assumes, as she does with her own 
identity, that Friday’s identity is a text and (also mistakenly) that all texts are 
readable.  Stanley Fish’s “Interpretive Communities” argues that readers operate 
under a number of assumptions during the process of interpreting a text; the main 
one being that texts contain within them a single, fixed “meaning” (Fish 219) or 
what Roland Barthes calls a “single ‘theological’ meaning” (Barthes 1), 
constituting the “truth” of the text.  Readers then believe they must extract this 
ostensibly stable and unchanging “truth” from the text.  This is precisely what 
Susan attempts to do with Friday throughout the novel, as the lingering question 
in her mind is:  “What is the truth of Friday?” (Coetzee 121).  Part of her 
discontent issues from the fact that she simply cannot read him, as his silence 
renders him unreadable.  Without a tongue with which to speak the truth, Friday 
cannot make available to Susan the origins of his identity, or rather, the story of 
his identity.  Susan believes that the secret of Friday’s tongue must be unveiled, 
but of course, “the only tongue that can tell Friday’s secret is the tongue he has 
lost” (67).   Friday is thus an open signifier that lacks a signified meaning. 
Coetzee, I believe, creates Friday to demonstrate that reading is not only an act of 
misreading, as Harold Bloom might argue, but an act of non-reading.  In other 
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words, Friday represents the destabilization of interpretation.  Perhaps one could 
even argue that Friday embodies the intrinsic silence of all texts.     
Friday’s “unreadability” is characterized through the fact that so few truths 
can be verified about him.  Just when we attempt to pin down some veritable truth 
about his identity, like his tonguelessness for example, we find that even that 
cannot be confirmed.  Lewis MacLeod claims that Friday’s tonguelessness is 
itself a myth, because Susan never actually sees the missing tongue:  “I guess 
merely, I have not looked into your mouth.  When your master asked me to look, I 
would not” (Coetzee 85).  MacLeod argues that the assumption that Friday has 
undergone a “radical mutilation” is therefore “derived not from Friday’s body 
(which remains undiscovered) but from the pulse of eternal critical discourses” 
(MacLeod 7).  For this reason, MacLeod believes it is possible that Friday indeed 
has a tongue, and that his silence is “a voluntary act…Friday has the capacity, just 
not the inclination, for speech” (7).  But essentially, we readers, and Susan 
herself, can derive no real meaning from Friday’s tonguelessness precisely 
because there is no way to know whether the symbol (the tongue) is actually there 
or not.  The same can be said for Friday’s other member, his phallus—which, like 
the tongue, has also been considered a symbol of desire and the signifying power 
of speech.  When Susan sees Friday’s robe swing open while he is dancing, 
exposing his naked body momentarily, it is unclear as to whether she sees 
evidence on his body of “a more atrocious mutilation” (119).  Therefore, like his 
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tongue, Friday’s phallus or castration also remains a mystery.  When Susan 
attempts to understand Friday’s silence, which she (as well as most critics) 
associates with his identity, she cannot figure out where his silence is derived 
from:  a missing tongue or a lack of inclination for speech.  She is also curious as 
to why Friday never attempted sexual intercourse with her, and does not know 
whether his lack of sexual desire derives from a missing phallus or, again, a lack 
of inclination.  As symbols associated with Friday’s identity, the tongue and 
phallus serve as open signifiers, not unlike Friday himself.  It is to this extent that 
Friday remains unreadable.  When critics such as Derek Attridge attempt to make 
meaning out of Friday’s tonguelessness, arguing for example that it represents his 
oppression (Attridge 86), they fail to see the extent to which the tongue operates 
as a non-symbol. With no visible symbol, it is nearly impossible to derive 
symbolic meaning from Friday, as he seems to resist the act of meaning-making 
itself. 
What, then, do we do with Friday? Arguably, Susan represents all of those 
who participate in literary criticism, as critics themselves seem to embody Susan’s 
desire to dive into the wreck and discover the truth of Friday’s identity
33
.  But if 
Friday is rendered unreadable, critics, like Susan, find themselves in a double 
                                                          
33
 Since, like Defoe’s novel, Foe also operates dually as a work of fiction and literary criticism, it is 
possible that Coetzee uses Friday to critique the process of literary criticism and interpretation  
typical of the twentieth century.  Perhaps, through Friday, Coetzee discourages structuralist 
approaches to literary criticism, which tended to privilege the idea of “extracting” meaning from 
the text, in favor of post-structuralist ones.  
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bind.  On the one hand, if we simply mirror Friday’s silence and say nothing, we 
miss out on the many discourses that derive from reading Foe; on the other hand, 
to say anything about Friday is possibly to misrepresent or recreate him.  This 
issue of re-creation is worth examining for the moment, because according to 
Stanley Fish, all reading is essentially an act of creation on the reader’s part:  
“meanings are not extracted but made and made not by encoded forms but by 
interpretive strategies that call forms into being” (Fish 220).  In other words, 
readers create meaning based not on what is essential to the text, but rather, on the 
interpretive strategies they bring to the text.  According to Fish, these interpretive 
strategies are formed by interpretive communities; so, for example, a critic 
operating within a post-colonial framework will likely apply post-colonial 
interpretive strategies to Foe.  From such a perspective, Friday could be read (or 
re-written) as a victim of racial oppression, as Attridge suggests. Lewis MacLeod 
argues that the attempt of literary critics, and of Susan, to read Friday is actually 
an attempt to write Friday in their own terms:  “Friday is…subject to the demands 
of dominant discourses and their tendencies to reconfigure meanings and 
identities” (MacLeod 6).  Even Susan admits that it is her reading of Friday which 
gives shape to his identity:  “Friday…has no defence against being re-shaped day 
by day in conformity with the desires of others.  I say he is a cannibal and he 
becomes a cannibal.  I say he is a laundryman and he becomes a laundryman. 
What is the truth of Friday? …What he is to the world is what I make of him” 
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(Coetzee 121-122).  In other words, the truth of Friday is created not by Friday 
himself, but by the words of Susan, and according to MacLeod, also literary 
critics who attempt to “re-shape” or “reconfigure” Friday’s identity.  I will return, 
then, to my original question:  What do we do with Friday?  Are we doing him an 
injustice by reading and writing about him?  Appropriating him for our own 
discursive or political agendas?   
I would argue that there is no harm in attempting to read or to write about 
Friday, and that the only thing we must be careful of in our acts of literary 
criticism is to not be like Susan.  Susan’s problem is not that she attempts to read 
Friday, but that she assumes that there is a center or “truth” to his identity that can 
and must be revealed.  In other words, Susan takes reading as a form of unveiling, 
and I believe that Coetzee presents Friday to remind us of what Locke originally 
claimed about language: that reading is an act that engages only with ideas and 
not truths.  That being said, there are many ideas worth discussing and exploring 
regarding Friday, such as his purpose in choosing to operate outside all forms of 
normative language, and the ways in which he actually does engage in his own 
forms of expression, not through language, but through music and dance.   
If MacLeod is correct in assuming that “Friday has the capacity, just not 
the inclination, for speech” (7), the purpose of his silence is worth exploring. 
Perhaps Friday’s unwillingness to participate in speech issues from the fact that 
he simply has no need for speech.  Since he is not a speaking subject, he is not 
107 
 
marked by the “lack” of all speaking subjects, and therefore has no desire for 
language, for truth, or for anything else
34
. Susan clearly draws this connection 
between speech and desire:  “Oh, Friday, how can I make you understand the 
cravings felt by those of us who live in a world of speech to have our questions 
answered!  It is like our desire, when we kiss someone, to feel the lips we kiss 
respond to us” (Coetzee 79).  Speech and desire, being other-directed by nature, 
both require the recognition and response from an “other.”  But Friday, a fully 
interior, solipsistic character, has no need for an “other” the way Susan does, and 
clearly does not want Susan to attempt to read him.  When he draws the picture of 
the “walking eyes,” for example, Susan “reached out to take the slate…instead of 
obeying me, Friday…rubbed the slate clean” (147).  The picture of the walking 
eyes, along with Friday’s  mysterious ritual of scattering petals in the ocean, 
indicates that he does engage with his own acts of symbolism, but his symbols do 
not operate the way Susan’s do, because his have no need for an “other” to read 
them.  They are self-contained signifiers, intended only for himself.  Susan, on the 
other hand, spends most of the novel waiting for a response to her letters from 
Foe, precisely because she, unlike Friday, wants to be read and understood by an 
“other.”  It seems as though Friday, on the other hand, does not want to let Susan 
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 Because I have discussed the application of interpretive strategies, I must admit to the 
strategies I myself use in my reading of Friday.  Arguably, my reading of Friday derives from the 
view that language operates out of desire and lack, so that Friday’s willingness to opt out of 
language signifies a lack of desire.  This idea will be examined in more depth in the following 
discussion.   
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enter his world of interiority, because doing so would allow her to read him, and 
would also suggest that there is something essential there to be read.  There is 
some evidence that Friday’s unwillingness to participate in language is 
symptomatic of his disbelief in its utility.  In fact, Susan questions whether 
“somewhere within him he was laughing at [Susan’s] efforts to bring him nearer 
to a state of speech”
 
(146). This may be true, given that the few times that he 
engages in traditional acts of speech and writing (which is only when he is forced 
to by Cruso or Susan) he says “ha-ha-ha,” (22) possibly laughing at or mocking 
Susan’s desire for speech.  When Susan gets him to write on a slate, he writes “h-
s-h-s-h-s” (146), which could be his way of “shushing” her.  Susan begins to 
realize that “it might not be mere dullness that kept him shut up in himself, nor 
the accident of the loss of his tongue…but a disdain for intercourse with me.” 
(98).   
Perhaps Coetzee keeps Friday separate and disconnected from Susan to 
demonstrate the extent of their difference.  If we examine their relationship 
through a Lacanian scheme, Friday and Susan could be representative of two 
different Lacanian orders.  As mentioned in the previous section, Susan resides 
within the Symbolic order, made up of substitution, desire, and linguistic signs.  If 
Susan belongs to the Symbolic order, Friday belongs to the Imaginary order, 
which embodies what Lacan calls a “self-sufficiency of consciousness” (Lacan, 
“Mirror Stage,” 6).  The Imaginary order is without speech or desires, or more 
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specifically, represents the part of the subject’s fantasy in which all desires are 
achieved.  In this fantasy, the subject and the object of desire are one and the 
same; the barriers between them effaced (6).  One could argue, then, that Friday 
allegorically represents this fantasy, this non-human ideal of existence, while 
Susan represents the human condition, marked by lack, desire, and persistent 
longing.   
Friday’s engagement with music and dance represents the ways in which 
he operates within the Imaginary order.  His “self-sufficiency” of consciousness is 
visible through his engagement with music and dance, because even though they 
are forms of communication, they communicate only with the self.  They are raw 
forms of expression which are not intrinsically other-directed.  In other words, 
through music and dance, Friday finds a way in which to express himself that 
reaches beyond the discursive limits of language.  Even Susan recognizes that “if 
there were any language accessible to Friday, it would be the language of music” 
(Coetzee 96).  Music and dance both originate from the body, and are modes of 
communication which exist outside the realm of slippery signifiers. Therefore, 
they exist outside the realm of the Symbolic.   Unlike normative speech, music 
and dance do not serve as a means to an end; they have no practical utility and 
serve as intrinsic ends in themselves.  Like the body, music and dance “are their 
own signs” (157).  They are, therefore, truly solipsistic activities, because while 
they can involve an observer, there is no need for one.  When Susan attempts to 
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connect with Friday through music, she again is disappointed:  “The music we 
made was not pleasing:  there was a subtle discord all the time, though we seemed 
to be playing the same notes” (96).  No matter what attempt Susan makes to enter 
Friday’s world, she finds herself invariably disconnected from him.  The 
“language” Friday uses through music and dance is, like Friday himself, not a 
readable one.  Still, Susan remains unaware of the impossibility of discovering 
Friday or exploring his “true” identity; that his engagement with music, though it 
is a type of language, is not an attempt to communicate with her.   
Friday reminds us that, like his identity, texts contain no singular or 
central truth that can be accessed or extracted through the process of reading.  As 
Rowland Barthes has argued, a text is “a multi-dimensional space in which a 
variety of writings, none of them original, blend and clash” (Barthes 1).  Because, 
like all texts, Friday’s identity is not something that is essentially accessible to 
readers, any attempt to read Friday (whether from a post-colonial or post-
structuralist perspective) will not prove ultimately “useful” in the utilitarian sense 
of the word—but interpretation is not a utilitarian activity.  It is worth repeating 
that despite Friday’s “unreadability,” we need not remain silent about Friday.  
Instead, we must simply be aware of our own urges to dive into the wreck.  While 
we may, like Susan, come up with any number of myths and stories about what 
we believe is the truth of identity and the truth of the wreck, we will never access 
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the wreck itself.  In the end, Susan—along with all readers, authors, and literary 
critics, must acquiesce to its inherent “unknowability.”  
  
Conclusion 
Significantly, in the last section of the novel, there is some indication that 
Coetzee himself admits to feeling, like Susan, the same frustrated desire for truth.  
In a dreamlike narration, Coetzee writes himself into his own story, and performs 
what Susan has been trying to do all along:  he dives into the wreck.  This final 
sequence is short, and divided into two parts.  Arguably, these two parts are 
separate attempts to end the novel; the second being a revision of the first
35
.  I 
base this idea on the fact that both sections seem to follow the same basic 
narrative trajectory:  Coetzee enters Foe’s home and finds the dead bodies of the 
young Susan Barton, the protagonist Susan, Foe, and Friday
36
.  In both versions, 
Coetzee attempts to find a way into Friday’s mouth: “his teeth are clenched, I 
press a fingernail between the upper and lower rows, trying to part them” (154).  
The vital difference between the first part (153-154) and the revision (155-157) is 
that in the revision, Coetzee finally dives into the wreck himself.  “With a sigh, 
making barely a splash, I slip overboard” (155).  The narration repeats almost 
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 By keeping both these attempts in the final version of the novel, Coetzee self-consciously 
illustrates his own difficulties with authorship.   
36
 Actually in the first section, Friday is alive, but in the revision, it is unclear as to whether he is 
alive or dead, but he is “half buried in sand, his knees drawn up, his hands between his thighs…” 
(157).   
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verbatim Susan’s own language in the opening of the novel when she lands on 
Cruso’s island (5).  Coetzee embodies Susan here, or at the very least, embodies 
her desire to “explore the wreck” (32).   
The dark mass of the wreck is flecked here and there with 
white.  It is huge, greater than the leviathan:  a hulk shorn of 
masts, split across the middle, banked on all sides with sand.  
The timbers are black, the hole even blacker that gives entry.  
If the kraken lurks anywhere, it lurks here…I enter the hole 
(156)  
 
If I am correct in assuming that Coetzee’s wreck represents the same thing here as 
it does in Rich’s poem, the hole that Coetzee enters is truth itself; the problem is 
that, as Crusoe warned, the wreck is not something that can ultimately prove to be 
useful. In a way, it is unexplorable and inaccessible even as Coetzee tries to enter 
it.  It is huge, dark, and “banked on all sides with sand.”  The kraken, the 
mythological creature that Foe mentioned in passing to Susan (140), lurks with 
the wreck, so that somehow the truth of the wreck seems intrinsically tied to the 
myth or “the story of the wreck.”  Coetzee continues exploring, as “the stub of 
candle hangs on a string around my neck…though it sheds no light” (156).  
Despite the utter darkness, Coetzee continues to explore, swimming through the 
“soft, dank, slimy” (156) sand of the water.  But despite these numerous 
obstructions, he manages at last to find Friday, and asks him, “Friday…what is 
this ship?” (157). Like Susan, and like we readers, Coetzee hopes to get an answer 
out of Friday, to learn the truth of the wreck: 
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But this is not a place of words.  Each syllable, as it comes 
out, is caught and filled with water and diffused.  This is a 
place where bodies are their own signs. It is the home of 
Friday…I pass a fingernail across his teeth, trying to find a 
way in.  His mouth opens.  From inside him comes a slow 
stream, without breath, without interruption.  It flows up 
through his body and out upon me; it passes through the 
cabin, through the wreck (157).     
 
Here we find that even Coetzee, the author of Foe, cannot access the truth of the 
wreck.  Even his own words are “caught and filled with water and diffused.”  
While he manages to get into Friday’s mouth, instead of finding a language there 
that will orient him toward truth, he is confronted with the “slow stream, without 
breath, without interruption.”  This uninterrupted stream is precisely the opposite 
of the fragmented nature of language, the gap between the  and signified, as “this 
is not a place of words.”  Even while he is immersed within the wreck itself, its 
“truth” remains out of reach, whether with or without language. Based on this last 
section, we might conclude that the traumatic loss of authority Susan experiences 
in her role as author, her quest to find out the truth of her own identity and 
Friday’s, her unfulfilled desire to explore the wreck, is whole-heartedly 
experienced by Coetzee himself—and arguably, by all readers and authors of 




Chapter 5:  Closing Remarks 
The intellectual development of Defoe’s and Coetzee’s collective mono-
character becomes visible when reading the novels in their chronological order.   
By employing the mode of autobiography, Crusoe, Roxana, and Susan each hope 
to achieve some level of self-mastery, whether it is confirmation of self-existence, 
self-knowledge, or self-representation in language.  As I have discussed, Crusoe 
represents the earliest stage in the mono-character’s development, believing that 
language is somehow symmetrical with truth, and therefore, that his own 
language as an author grants him the power to create truth, rather than fictions.  
Roxana, serving as a revision of Crusoe, extends Crusoe’s level of understanding 
about the limits of language and authorship.  But Defoe provides no clear 
indication that she sees identity as essentially a discursive construct.  I have 
attempted to show that Coetzee’s Susan surpasses both Crusoe’s and Roxana’s 
level of intellect, but significantly, I do not wish to imply that Susan necessarily 
provides closure to the problematic of identity.  Susan recognizes, by the end of 
Foe, the role that language and signification play in the formation of identity, and 
that her position as an author is not one of authority.  For Coetzee, Susan’s 
narrative purpose is not to complete the intellectual trajectory of the mono-
character, because to do so would seem to validate the myth of self-mastery.  
Instead, Susan realizes the impossibility of self-mastery, and in doing so extends 
the intellectual trajectory of both Crusoe and Roxana, without finishing it off.  
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Coetzee provides no sense of closure to Susan’s story, a writerly move that once 
again parallels Defoe’s treatment of Roxana at the end of her story.  
 I have suggested that, in the twentieth-century, Coetzee continues the 
intellectual trajectory of a “mono-character” initiated by Defoe over two hundred 
years prior.  While much of the scholarship on Foe focuses on its relevance within 
the larger context of either post-colonialism or post-structuralism, it is important 
to consider, for the moment, the role of historicism in the development of 
Coetzee’s novel.   What motivates Coetzee to re-write Defoe’s characters who 
were written so long before his time?  It is possible that Coetzee’s extrapolation of 
Defoe’s mono-character may be a testament to how eighteenth-century concerns 
regarding language and identity have extended into the post-structural era of the 
twentieth-century.  Even more significantly, Coetzee’s novel highlights the extent 
to which the philosophical inquiries of the eighteenth century remain at large even 
in the twentieth-century and beyond.   
It may be helpful to look at Coetzee’s revision of Defoe’s texts as just a 
singular example of how the post-structural era similarly re-imagines and revises 
eighteenth-century philosophical dialogues.  I have already mentioned that 
Coetzee makes explicit in Foe ideas that were only implicit in Robinson Crusoe 
and Roxana.  But another major revision that Coetzee performs is the necessary 
consideration of readership and interpretation in the investigation of authority and 
authorship in autobiographical writing.   While authorship and the destabilization 
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of authority is clearly a major theme in Defoe’s texts, readership and 
interpretation do not play as significant a role.  Coetzee, however, operating under 
the influence of Foucault, Lacan, Barthes, and Stanley Fish in the twentieth-
century, makes readership a central concern in Susan’s development.  Arguably, it 
is Susan’s relationship with Friday and her realizations about the destabilizing 
effects of interpretation, which allow her to recognize that the self is not only the 
author of identity, but also a reader of identity.  Friday, to some extent, operates 
as a stand-in for Susan, as her desire to know Friday parallels her desire to 
“discover” her own identity.  Coetzee also develops this idea with Susan’s 
relationship to the young Susan Barton.  As I mentioned in the previous chapter, 
this relationship represents Susan’s attempt to read her own identity in order to 
grasp its objective meaning.  It is this process of reading (or more importantly, her 
inability to read) the text of her identity that eventually allows her to recognize 
her own “authorial” and “metaphysical” identity as a narrative structure that is not 
so readable or knowable.  
Coetzee’s work, however, should not necessarily be read as an 
improvement upon Defoe’s.  To close, I would instead like to stress the 
intellectual exchange between the eighteenth century and the post-structural era.  
It is important to note the extent to which eighteenth-century figures such as 
Defoe laid the foundation for post-structural works like Coetzee’s.   It is possible 
that, as Ian Watt has argued, the coincidence of the rise of the modern novel with 
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epistemological inquiries into the self posed by Hobbes and Locke helped initiate 
the turn toward individualism in the eighteenth century, which subsequently led to 
attempts to destabilize normative structures of authority.  By problematizing 
identity and the stability of the “I,” Defoe’s work subverts the authority of 
language as well as that of authors. Arguably, it is this type of work that preempts 
Barthes’ “Death of the Author,” and Foucault’s “What is an Author?” both 
written during the post-structural era.   
Defoe’s and Coetzee’s collective interest in authorship, language, 
authority, and identity are therefore not coincidental, and they require further 
investigation.  Both authors, in their respective historical moments, utilize the 
form of pseudo-autobiography to attempt to expose self-mastery as a myth, and 
identity as a myth of language. More importantly, Defoe’s and Coetzee’s textual 
relationship reveals larger implications about the intellectual exchange that is still 
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